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For a century, scholars of Palestine have wrestled with the repercussions of 
missionary efforts in the region. Most scholarship focuses on nineteenth-century 
educational and ecclesiastical endeavors, as innovations in technology proved mutually 
transformative. These accounts define the relationship between missionaries, colonialism, 
and the emergence of the modern state. Less attention, however, has been paid to the impact 
of medical missions. These institutions interacted with every segment of society while 
concurrently engaging with practices of religion, law, and medicine. In Palestine, they 
provoked an ambivalent response amongst the populace who benefited from their medical 
services but generally disdained their proselytizing practices that tore at the social fabric. 
Palestinians felt compelled to react to the practices of mission hospitals. The minute 
records of mission hospitals, paired with Palestinian reactions to their polarizing practices, 
allow scholars to trace subtle transformations in the making of modern Palestine. 
This thesis examines the history of a mission hospital in Gaza, operated by Anglo-
American missionaries for nearly a century, and analyzes developments in Gazan society, 
medicine, and law by gauging responses to missionary medicine. Drawing heavily on 
v 
original archival material from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and Foreign Mission 
Board (FMB), I interact with a century-long historical record (1882-1981). Rather than 
focus on the defining political moments in Palestinian history, this thesis takes interest in 
the quotidian experiences that contextualize the region. These experiences provide new 
perspective and complement the existing historiography of Palestine. 
In addition to this historiography, this thesis interacts with scholarship on missions, 
modern medicine, and colonialism in the Middle East. I expand on previous scholarship in 
terms of period and institutional focus. Much attention has been paid to the history of 
missions during the nineteenth century, but few scholars trace how missions developed into 
the twentieth century. Studying missions in this century overturns prior conceptions of 
missionary history while speaking to further developments in the modern Middle East. 
Second, this thesis brings attention to missionary medicine, which is often subsumed under 
colonialism. By defining missionary medicine and differentiating it from the colonial 
project, this thesis strives to better understand its impact on Gaza.   
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On 8 February 1954, the responsibility for operating the Sterling Memorial Hospital 
in Gaza transferred from British to American hands.1 A seemingly insignificant moment, 
that never appeared in the headlines of major newspapers, it represented the historical 
developments that helped define the modern Middle East. The Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) of the Anglican Communion established the medical mission in 1882 and operated 
it until 1954, paralleling the height of British colonialism in the Middle East. In 1882, 
British forces occupied Egypt following the Anglo-Egyptian War, maintaining a degree of 
de facto control over the Egyptian government and military until 1956. The British military 
occupied nearby Palestine during World War I and proceeded to govern the region until 
1948. Britain maintained control over Egypt and Palestine, the two regions bordering Gaza, 
until the decade following World War II when the United States largely replaced the role 
vacated by the British Empire. In Gaza, American missionaries from the Foreign Mission 
Board (FMB) of the Southern Baptist Convention purchased the CMS mission hospital in 
1954. The FMB renamed the medical institution, calling it the Gaza Baptist Hospital, and 
operated it until 1981. This same Anglo-American mission hospital met the medical needs 
of Gaza for a century, but polarized Gazan society with its evangelical practices.  
The records and correspondence of FMB and CMS missionaries offer an 
uninterrupted account of Gaza between 1882 and 1981, a century that defined the 
 
1 J.T. McRae, Minutes of the Arab Baptist Mission Jerusalem, H.K. of Jordan May 24-27, 1954 (Jerusalem: 
Arab Baptist Mission, May 1954), 1, International Mission Board Minutes. 
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contemporary territory. The mission hospital, and the missionaries who operated it, found 
themselves at the intersection of defining transformations in Gazan society, medicine, and 
law. The mission hospital offered services to and treated every segment of Gazan society. 
Its narrative provides a unique perspective on the international, regional, and local 
authorities who shaped modern Gaza in addition to the inhabitants and refugees who 
resided in the territory during this formative century. First and foremost, this thesis takes 
interest in describing and analyzing transformations in Gazan society, medicine, and law—
missionary records make possible this endeavor.  
Mission Organizations 
Contextualizing the CMS and FMB helps to understand their aims and aspirations 
in Gaza. The CMS, the organization that founded the Gazan medical mission in 1882, was 
established on 12 April 1799. The organization found its spiritual roots in the great revival 
of John Wesley and others, including Anglican clergy, who wished to renew and redefine 
their faith in the mid-eighteenth century. These church leaders coalesced under the 
significance of individual conversion and justification by faith, which encouraged 
members in the Church of England to evangelize the “Heathen.” The society confirmed in 
1812, “It is the duty high incumbent upon every Christian to endeavour to propagate the 
knowledge of the Gospel among the Heathen.”2 The CMS delivered on this statement by 
directing their first missions to “Africa and the East.”3 The CMS took interest in traveling 
 
2 Church Missionary Society, The Missionary Papers, 1816-1878 (London: Church Missionary Society, 
1816). 
3 Rosemary Keen, Church Missionary Society Archive: General Introduction and Guide to the Archive 
(Marlborough, England: Church Missionary Society, n.d.), Adam Matthew. 
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beyond the British Isles, so it communicated with the British East India Company, which 
initially dissuaded the missionaries from entering India, China, and Japan. Instead, the 
missionaries set their eyes on West Africa, specifically Sierra Leone, where several of the 
CMS founders were directors of the Sierra Leone Company. After Sierra Leone, the CMS 
proceeded to establish missions in areas of British imperialism including Nigeria, South 
Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Sudan, and the 
Seychelles. By 1814, the CMS had convinced the British East India Company to allow 
them entrance into India. The Opium War allowed CMS missionaries to enter China by 
1842. In the nineteenth century, the CMS also sent missionaries to its overseas territories 
in Canada, the West Indies, Australia, and New Zealand. Missions to the Mediterranean 
and Middle East proved the most difficult for the CMS, but the organization finally gained 
permanent access to Egypt, Palestine, and other regions in the Ottoman Empire following 
the Anglo-Egyptian War in 1882. The Veiled Protectorate in Egypt, the term used to 
describe British interference in Egyptian governance, and the later British Mandate over 
Palestine, enabled CMS missionaries to establish and maintain their missions in these 
regions, including the CMS mission hospital in Gaza (1882-1954).4  
In 1954, the FMB purchased the CMS hospital in Gaza as part of its postwar 
mission strategy. The FMB was founded at the first Southern Baptist Convention in 1845, 
the same convention in which Northern and Southern American Baptists separated into two 




China and Sub-Saharan Africa, mirroring many of the CMS mission endeavors in the mid-
nineteenth century. The Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction Era placed considerable 
debt on the FMB, and it was not in a financial position to support major overseas missions 
until the end of World War II (1861-1945). After the Second World War, the FMB 
experienced a growth spurt during which it sent over one-thousand missionaries abroad by 
1955 and several thousand by 1965. The FMB mission strategy followed the Great 
Commission of Matthew 28, “Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing 
them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,” which the 
organization interpreted as establishing a missionary presence in all the nation-states of the 
world. The FMB sent missionaries to many nations in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Southern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. Missions to 
the Middle East concentrated on the Arab Gulf, with mission stations in Yemen, and al-
Mashriq, with missions in Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. The FMB hospital in 
Gaza, the Gaza Baptist Hospital, was a small part of the FMB’s strategy to deliver the 
gospel message to the many nation-states of the postwar world.5 The directives and 
accomplishments of the FMB have been documented in a copious number of records, 
memoirs, and other documents written by missionaries and their supporters.  
Missionary Medicine in the Middle East 
Scholarship on missionary endeavors, however, expands beyond mission 
hagiography, as scholars of colonialism reconcile with the consequences of missionaries 
 
5 International Mission Board, “175 Timeline,” IMB, n.d., accessed February 17, 2021, 
https://www.imb.org/175/. 
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and their sending organizations. The Middle East is no exception where the historiography 
of missionary encounters is well-established. Although this historiography has evolved 
over a century, scholars continue to draw from the records and correspondence of 
missionaries to glean new arguments on the making of the modern Middle East. Ussama 
Makdisi, Beth Baron, Heather Sharkey, and Jeffery Culang have provided notable 
scholarship on Euro-American missionary efforts in the modern Middle East and the 
repercussions of their encounters.6 Rather than valorize or demonize the actions of 
missionaries, these scholars reinterpret the missionaries’ relationship with modernity for 
the sake of Arab history. Makdisi locates the emergence of Arab ecumenism within the 
writings of Butrus al-Bustani, a nahda intellectual who interacted with American 
Presbyterian missionaries.7 Baron and Sharkey, on the other hand, note resistance to the 
missionary message with the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood and concept of religious 
freedom in Egypt.8 Culang builds from Baron and Sharkey to show how missionary efforts 
in Egypt, led by the American missionary Samuel Zwemer, spurred transformational 
understandings of religious freedom in modern Egypt.9 Makdisi, Baron, Sharkey, and 
 
6 Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle 
East, The United States in the world (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Ussama Makdisi, 
“Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism, and Evangelical Modernity,” The American 
Historical Review 102, no. 3 (1997): 680–713; Heather J. Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: 
Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Beth Baron, The 
Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2014); Jeffrey Culang, “‘The Shari’a Must Go’: Seduction, Moral Injury, and 
Religious Freedom in Egypt’s Liberal Age,” Comparative Studies in Society and History; Cambridge 60, 
no. 2 (April 2018): 446–475. 
7 Ussama Makdisi, Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World 
(Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019). 
8 Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt; Baron, The Orphan Scandal. 
9 Culang, “The Shari’a Must Go.” 
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Culang provide a model for how to utilize the records of Euro-American missionaries in a 
way that privileges local agency.  
When analyzing missionary endeavors in the Middle East, few scholars have noted 
their relationship with modern medicine. Most scholarship on Anglo-American 
missionaries in this region focuses on ecclesiastical and educational endeavors during the 
nineteenth century, demonstrating how translation, printing technologies, and pedagogy 
transformed missions and society. Few scholars of the Middle East have attended to 
missionary medicine, despite the prevalence of this type of scholarship in India, China, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.10 David Hardiman, for example, built his academic career analyzing 
missionary medicine in India, where he examines the parallel processes of decolonization 
as both the missionaries and people whom they treated wrestled through similar projects 
of legitimation and transformation during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries.11 Melanie Tanielian suggests the possibility of this type of research in the Middle 
East in The Charity of War.12 She notes reactions to starvation and disease during World 
War I and how these reactions subsequently shaped the Lebanese political landscape. 
Despite rampant suffering due to famine, she considers the “power of provisioning” as 
 
10 Yuet-wah Cheung, Missionary Medicine in China: A Study of Two Canadian Protestant Missions in 
China before 1937 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988); Walima T. Kalusa, “Missionaries, 
African Patients, and Negotiating Missionary Medicine at Kalene Hospital, Zambia, 1906-1935,” Journal 
of southern African studies 40, no. 2 (2014): 283–294; David Hardiman, Missionaries and Their Medicine: 
A Christian Modernity for Tribal India (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); David Hardiman, ed., Healing Bodies, Saving Souls: Medical Missions in Asia and 
Africa, 80 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006). 
11 Hardiman, Missionaries and Their Medicine; Nandini Chatterjee, “Missionaries and Their Medicine: A 
Christian Modernity for Tribal India,” Social History of Medicine 22, no. 1 (April 1, 2009): 214–215. 
12 Melanie S. Tanielian, The Charity of War: Famine, Humanitarian Aid, and World War I in the Middle 
East (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018), 5,17. 
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those who mobilized aid attained long-lasting social capital.13 According to Tanielian, 
those who benefited from the “power of provisioning” included Ottoman administrators, 
Lebanese merchants, religious leaders, and American missionaries who mutually defined 
postwar Lebanon through their reactions to suffering. Although American missionaries do 
not inhabit a central position in Tanielian’s analysis, she exemplifies how their actions in 
wartime Lebanon became a significant aspect of postwar developments. My thesis will 
build from the example of Tanielian by noting local responses to the mission hospital in 
Gaza and questioning how these responses denote sociopolitical, medical, and legal 
developments. 
Understanding the relationship between Gazan society and the mission hospital 
hinges upon the definition of missionary medicine as a distinct category of modern 
medicine, different from colonial medicine. Numerous scholars have attempted to define 
colonial medicine and its relationship to the military, economy, and administration of the 
colonial state. A close connection between medical knowledge and colonial power was 
often used by colonial officials to justify their actions. Colonial medicine had a distinct 
goal in colonial society. Whether to protect the colonial enclave or to justify the colonial 
project as relief for what it claimed were the inherently diseased bodies of their colonial 
subjects, colonial medicine worked first and foremost to serve the interests of the 
metropole.14 Scholars often subsume missionary medicine under the same banner of 
 
13 Ibid., 17. 
14 Radhika Ramasubban, Public Health and Medical Research in India: Their Origins Under the Impact of 
British Colonial Policy (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, 1982); 
Gyan Prakash, “Body Politic in Colonial India,” in Questions of Modernity, ed. Timothy Mitchell, vol. 11 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
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colonial medicine. Although missionary medicine shared many of the characteristics of 
colonial medicine, I follow the lead of Khaled Fahmy in distinguishing categories of 
modern medicine. Fahmy distances what he calls “khedival medicine” from the colonial 
medicine of British India and colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.15 He explains that unlike 
colonial medicine, khedival medicine did not deny the sovereignty of the Egyptian people, 
labeling the Egyptian body as inherently diseased and incapable of self-rule, but instead 
touted medical pedagogy as open and available to Egyptian physicians.16 Missionary 
medicine, on the other hand, exists somewhere between colonial medicine and khedival 
medicine with a limited but not restricted medical pedagogy that served Gazan society in 
a universal but categorized manner. Chapter one of my thesis defines missionary medicine 
and examines the ways in which it manifested and integrated within Gazan society.  
A Site of Ambivalence 
After defining missionary medicine, chapters two and three expand upon a concept 
I call a site of ambivalence. My concept builds from Frantz Fanon’s comment, “Western 
medical science, being part of the oppressive system, has always provoked in the native an 
ambivalent attitude.”17 Missionary medicine, as practiced by the mission hospital in Gaza, 
both benefited and disrupted Gazan society. Therefore, I describe the mission hospital as a 
site of ambivalence. A site of ambivalence maintains contradictory features, in this case an 
institution committed to medicine and proselytism, which ensure its permanence while 
 
15 Khaled Fahmy, In Quest of Justice: Islamic Law and Forensic Medicine in Modern Egypt (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press, 2018). 
16 Ibid., 20. 
17 Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1994), 121. 
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preserving its imposition. The medicine and proselytism of the Anglo-American mission 
hospital in Gaza necessitated an ambivalent response from international, regional, and local 
authorities in Gaza. The inconsistent responses of these officials revealed the nature and 
capacity of their own legitimacy. With this approach, I emulate the work of Nancy 
Gallagher who studies colonial medicine in Tunisia.18 To identify the impact of European 
colonial medical practices, and the evolution of medical pedagogy in Tunisia, Gallagher 
examines epidemics as an indicator of social trends. Similar to a mission hospital, 
epidemics necessitated a response from different segments of Tunisian society. Gallagher 
uses these responses to write a social history of medicine in Tunisia during the nineteenth 
century. Through the responses of different members of Gazan society, I follow a similar 
trajectory as Gallagher to identify sociopolitical, medical, and legal developments in Gaza. 
My conception of a site of ambivalence also interacts with recent scholarship on 
Palestinian history, which focuses on the in-between moments, tracing the quotidian 
experiences of the people and institutions.19 These accounts do not intend to decentralize 
nor depoliticize the defining moments in Palestinian history but rather give new meaning 
to how individuals and institutions managed change, loss, and destruction. Ilana Feldman 
exemplifies this approach in Governing Gaza, arguing that bureaucratic practices 
 
18 Nancy Elizabeth Gallagher, Medicine and Power in Tunisia, 1780-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
19 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008); Michael Dumper, “Forty Years without Slumbering: Waqf Politics and 
Administration in the Gaza Strip, 1948–1987,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 2 (January 
1, 1993): 174–190; Randa Farah, “Palestinian Refugees, the Nation, and the Shifting Political Landscape,” 
Social Alternatives; Brisbane 32, no. 3 (2013): 41–47. 
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legitimated authority despite political ruptures during the twentieth century.20 Feldman 
describes Gazan governance with the term “tactical government,” defined as “a means of 
governing that shifts in response to crisis, that often works without long-term planning, and 
that presumes little stability in governing conditions.”21 I follow Feldman’s lead by locating 
practices that legitimized authority in Gaza. These practices become visible via reactions 
to the Anglo-American mission hospital. As individuals, agencies, and organizations 
responded to the medicine and proselytism of the mission hospital, they revealed the nature, 
sources, and capacity of their own legitimacy in Gaza. The historical processes that allowed 
for the proliferation of missionary medicine in Gaza, but ultimately curbed its proselytizing 
goals, become apparent by analyzing the mission hospital through the lens of social, 
medical, and legal ambivalence.   
Source Material: Possibilities and Limitations 
This thesis relies on archival material sourced from the CMS and International 
Mission Board (IMB) Archives. Most of the CMS Archives have been digitized and made 
available through Adam Matthew Publications. The remainder of the CMS collection is 
stored at the Cadbury Research Library at the University of Birmingham and the Crowther 
Library in Oxford. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, this thesis only includes digitized 
primary source material from the CMS. Of the digitized material, this thesis primarily 
focuses on the periodicals of Mercy and Truth and The Mission Hospital, which were 
published monthly between 1897 and 1955. The CMS archival sources, which have been 
 
20 Feldman, Governing Gaza. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
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perused and dissected by numerous scholars, comprise the primary evidence of the first 
chapter. The second and third chapters feature original archival material from the IMB 
Archives (the rebranded FMB). Working closely with an archivist at the IMB Archives in 
Richmond, Virginia, I accumulated a minute record of FMB missionary activities at their 
hospital in Gaza. These records include mission notes, missionary correspondence, and 
other primary source material such as legal records involving the medical institution and 
anecdotal descriptions of the hospital and its surroundings by travelers and other observers. 
In all three chapters, this thesis buttresses archival material with select memoirs, in English 
and Arabic, and government records published by the British Mandate, Egyptian 
Administration, and Israeli government.  
 The primary sources of the CMS and IMB archives offer numerous advantages for 
scholars of modern Gaza. First, they provide an uninterrupted record of Gazan history from 
the late-nineteenth century to the present. Despite significant regime change during this 
period, the mission hospital operated continuously for over a century. These primary 
sources also offer a unique perspective as the Anglo-American missionaries held an 
outsider and insider perspective. Most of the missionaries were born outside of Gaza and 
thus carry certain biases when understanding and interpreting the social, medical, and legal 
landscape of the city and its periphery. At the same time, many of these missionaries were 
permanently stationed in Gaza, serving most of their working career at this single 
institution. Furthermore, not all the missionaries in the hospital were born outside of the 
Middle East. Some of the mission accounts, written in English and Arabic, were compiled 
by Arab staff members who immigrated to Gaza from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and other 
 12 
neighboring regions to assist the CMS and FMB in operating the mission hospital. These 
archival records partially address the primary source issues that have confounded scholars 
of modern Palestine. To address the history of society and law in Palestine, Beshara 
Doumani calls historians to fill this “major lacuna” with sijillat al-makakim al-shar’iya 
(records of the Islamic religious courts).22 While Doumani has leveraged sijillat to write 
social histories focused on Nablus, Tripoli, and other cities in Palestine and Greater Syria,23  
similar sijillat are currently inaccessible in Gaza due to restrictions of the Israeli 
government. Missionary records from Gaza allow historians to address some of historical 
questions related to Gazan society, medicine, and law that are otherwise unanswerable due 
to source material limitations.  
 The CMS and IMB archives also present several limitations, which this thesis has 
attempted to offset with secondary sources and competing perspectives. The most 
noticeable limitation of the mission archives is their lack of specific patient records. The 
missionaries meticulously noted statistics of medical care, but rarely recorded the 
perspective of their patients. Most patient accounts are heavily interpreted through the 
missionary lens for missionary supporters in the metropole. The lack of patient perspective 
makes it difficult to judge how individuals in Gaza interpreted the mission hospital, save 
some isolated accounts. Another problem presented by the missionary archives is their 
 
22 Beshara Doumani, “Palestinian Islamic Court Records: A Source for Socioeconomic History,” Middle 
East Studies Association Bulletin 19, no. 2 (1985): 155. 
23 Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Beshara Doumani, Family Life in the Ottoman 
Mediterranean: A Social History, First published. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
2017). 
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inconsistent focus. For example, in the mid-twentieth century FMB missionaries paid 
considerable attention to legal disputes in Gaza. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
these legal considerations largely dissipated in their records, replaced with concerns about 
economic inflation. A related issue is that of medical goals. Both the CMS and FMB 
missionaries assert an unwavering commitment to medicine as a means towards 
evangelism, but the details of their medical strategy remain undefined. Despite failing to 
define their medical techniques and strategies, clear patterns of patient care emerge in their 
records. In this thesis, I attempt to fill these gaps to the best of my present ability, 
recognizing that an oral history of this topic, focused on the perspective of patients, might 
offer the scholarly panacea for lingering inadequacies in the archival record. Due to time 
and travel restrictions, this thesis does not include oral history accounts, which may prove 
invaluable to further developing this study.  
Structure 
The following chapters offer a chronological and thematic analysis of the Anglo-
American mission hospital and Gazan society. I study a century of the hospital’s history, 
from 1882 to 1981, and in each chapter focus on a different theme: society, medicine, and 
law. The first chapter (1882-1954) describes the establishment of the hospital and defines 
missionary medicine as a distinct category of modern medicine. It then analyzes how 
missionary medicine categorized and interacted with an evolving Gazan society. The 
second chapter (1954-1967) introduces my central concept, the site of ambivalence, to 
evaluate missionary medicine in Gaza and how it legitimized local, regional, and 
international authorities in Gaza. This chapter takes specific interest in the era of the 
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Egyptian Administration and how it legitimized its authority in Gaza through medical 
practices. The third chapter (1967-1981) continues the narrative of the Gaza Baptist 
Hospital as it navigated legal transformations after the Israeli military occupied the 
territory. This chapter focuses on property law and how the Israeli occupation impacted the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of local governing bodies. The conclusion (1981-present) 
provides a brief description of the hospital after FMB missionaries vacated it, before 




Before 1882, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of the Anglican Communion 
had failed to establish a permanent mission in the eastern Mediterranean. The society, 
founded in 1799, sent missionaries to West Africa, the West Indies, New Zealand, and 
India before attempting to enter the Ottoman Empire. The regions under Ottoman control 
required extreme caution as the missionaries lacked the support of British imperialism. The 
CMS attempted to enter the empire through Malta, which they described as the 
headquarters of their Mediterranean Mission. In Malta, they built a printing press in 1815 
to publish scriptures intended for distribution in the empire. In 1819, CMS missionaries 
attempted to establish mission stations in Ottoman Turkey but were forced to return to 
Malta by 1821.24  Four years later, in 1825, the CMS established missions amongst Coptic 
Christians in Egypt and Orthodox Christians in Ethiopia. However, mission work in Malta 
and Ethiopia ceased in 1840 and the Egyptian mission was relinquished in 1862. Early 
missions focused on translating and distributing scriptures in vernacular languages.25 These 
CMS missionaries lacked significant financial support, and often aggravated local and 
Ottoman authorities who interpreted their mission efforts as little but societal disruption. 
 In 1882, the CMS saw a new opportunity for mission work. British forces occupied 
Egypt following the Anglo-Egyptian War thus initiating a period described as the Veiled 
Protectorate. Under the protectorate, CMS missionaries returned to Egypt and its bordering 
 
24 Rosemary Keen, Church Missionary Society Archive: General Introduction and Guide to the Archive. 
25 Paul Sedra, From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth Century 
Egypt (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011). 
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regions with new mission strategies.26 Support from British colonial officials, paired with 
technological innovations, allowed the CMS to establish permanent missions in Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire, including a medical mission founded in Gaza. 
The CMS hospital founded in Gaza comprises the focus of this chapter, which 
defines missionary medicine as a distinct category of modern medicine and then analyses 
how CMS medical missionaries understood and engaged Gazan society. Missionary 
medicine in Gaza was neither “enclavist,” in that it only supported British imperial 
interests, nor universal, as it favored a certain type of patient.27 CMS missionaries 
categorized Gazan society with dichotomies: wealthy and impoverished, urban and rural, 
male and female, Muslim and Christian. Within each pair, the missionaries geared their 
medical attention toward what they perceived as the subordinated position. They 
maintained a commitment toward serving the poor, rural, and female members of Gazan 
society, with the support of a Christian staff.  
Missionary medicine, while it operated in a universal fashion, making modern 
medical care available to the entire population, it consciously postured itself as the 
medicine of the marginalized. Unlike colonial medicine, it transformed over time, coopting 
suitable authority based on present needs. The CMS hospital in Gaza garnered support from 
the metropole, Ottoman authorities, local officials, and colonial administrators during its 
half century of existence. What led to the demise of the hospital, when the CMS conceded 
 
26 Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt. 
27 I borrow the term “enclavist” from Fahmy who uses the term to differentiate Khedival medicine from 
colonial medicine. He, therefore, ties Khedival medicine to his universal conception of modern medicine. 
Fahmy, In Quest of Justice, 18. 
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to sell their institution to American missionaries, was not the termination of the British 
Mandate in Palestine, but the rapid transformation of Gazan society. The immutable 
calculus of British missionary medicine could not withstand a society that consolidated 
under anti-Zionism and anti-colonialism emerging from the war on Palestine.28   
*** 
In 1881, Rev. Dr. R. Elliot, a British medical missionary, arrived in Gaza with 
ambitions for a medical mission tied closely to British colonialism in the region. Elliot and 
other British medical missionaries cited General Charles Gordon, a British officer and 
administrator, as the inspiration for their medical mission to Gaza. When Gordon passed 
through Gaza, he noticed it “lacked a medical man and evangelistic work” and he 
encouraged the Church Missionary Society (CMS) to establish a medical dispensary.29 
Gordon took interest in Gaza for its strategic importance to British colonialism in Egypt. 
Colonial officials desired control over Gaza, especially Rafah in southern Gaza, to secure 
their investments in the Sinai Peninsula. The CMS worked alongside these colonial 
interests, but for its own purposes. In August 1881, the CMS Committee of the Medical 
Missionary Association raised £500 for the establishment of a medical mission in Gaza. 
The committee appointed Elliott to serve as the leader and sole physician of the mission. It 
supplied Elliot with £50 per year to purchase medicine and medical instruments to work in 
 
28 When I write the war on Palestine, I refer to Khalidi’s description of the ongoing, hundred years’ qar on 
Palestine from 1917 to the present. Rashid Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of 
Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017, First edition. (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt 
and Company, 2020). 
29 R.G Sterling, “History and Present Outlook of the Gaza Medical Mission,” in The Mission Hospital, vol. 
XXVI (Church Missionary Society Periodicals, 1922), 75; Church Missionary Society, The Church 
Missionary Atlas (Church Missionary Society Periodicals, 1896), 75. 
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the “old Philistine city” of Gaza.30 While missionaries frequently connected cities like Gaza 
to their biblical names and inhabitants, mostly for the benefit of their Christian readership 
in the metropole, they were under no illusion of the contemporary situation in Gaza.31 They 
identified the city of “20,000 Moslems” as a rare opportunity for medical evangelism 
amongst a non-Christian population.32   
Although the success of British medical missionaries in Gaza relied upon British 
colonial power, these missionaries saw their role in separate terms, viewing Gaza as an 
isolated location to conduct medical proselytism amongst Muslims. The first medical 
missionary in Gaza, Elliot, was soon replaced by Rev. Dr. R.G. Sterling who would serve 
the hospital for over two decades.33 Sterling, a trained surgeon, arrived in 1891 and 
established the first modern hospital in Gaza called Dar ‘Abd an-Nur.34 Like most medical 
missionaries, he saw medicine as a means towards evangelism. He was ordained a minister 
in the Anglican Church before subsequently taking a medical degree.35 From the onset, he 
described Gaza as unique from other CMS missions in Palestine and Egypt, an “almost 
purely Mohammedan Mission.”36 For Sterling and the other medical missionaries who 
joined him in Gaza, their mission derived its value not from its connection to the Bible 
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Lands nor its extension of British power in Palestine. Rather, its value lay in its ability to 
operate amongst an otherwise unreached Muslim population. Other Anglo-American 
missions that attempted to evangelize Muslims in Palestine and Egypt had failed. Due to 
pressure from Ottoman and local authorities, they developed evangelism strategies 
targeting local Christian to reach Muslims indirectly.37 Sterling anticipated Gaza, a 
borderland between Palestine and Egypt, to become a conduit for future missions to 
Muslims in the region.  
The introduction of British missionary medicine in Gaza met opposition, but CMS 
missionaries turned to the Ottoman government for support. Sterling established the CMS 
hospital in Gaza within a private residence and noted “incredible opposition” to the erection 
of hospital services.38 British missionaries working across Palestine experienced intense 
scrutiny for their proselytizing missions, especially from local officials. Ottoman 
authorities followed suite and closed many CMS schools during the late nineteenth century. 
However, missionary medical institutions avoided the same degree of censure from 
Ottoman administrators. In 1896, the CMS hospital in Gaza treated a relatively small 
number of patients, with 343 in-patients and 615 operations, but their services were enough 
to garner the support of the Ottoman government who granted the hospital a firman 
(charter).39 Ottoman authorities condoned the interventions of British missionary medicine 
in exchange for medical aid in the empire’s periphery. With time, their medical capabilities 
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outweighed their more controversial religious practices. In Nablus and Gaza, missionaries 
recorded that even local Muslim officials “who formerly were prominent opponents, have 
in some cases entered the hospital as patients.”40 Medical missionaries sought admiration 
from the local Gazan population, but did not hesitate to buttress their efforts in Gaza with 
the support of Ottoman officials. The Ottoman firman allowed missionary medicine to 
operate despite local opposition.  
Eventually, Muslims in Gaza began to tentatively accept the medical practices of 
the missionaries, while maintaining a degree of separation from their proselytizing efforts. 
The British medical missionaries aimed to expose all patients to the gospel message. They 
would regularly pray and read bible verses to both in-patients and out-patients.41 These 
passive attempts at evangelism proved ineffective as most patients looked “stolid” as they 
listened to the missionary message.42 Although Muslim patients in Gaza understood the 
proselytizing efforts of the CMS hospital, they continued to visit the complex with 
stipulations. Many Muslim patients objected to “dying under a Christian roof” and asked 
to be escorted outside of the hospital premises during their final moments.43 At the time of 
death, the medical missionaries would make a final effort to convince their patients of the 
gospel message. Wary of this tactic, Muslims in Gaza sought medical attention at the CMS 
hospital with a strong degree of skepticism.  
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While modern medicine had the potential to reach patients in a universal manner, 
missionary medicine in Gaza was often more selective in its coverage. The medical 
missionaries divided their understanding of Gazan society into binaries: rich versus poor, 
urban versus rural, male versus female, and Muslim versus Christian. Within each binary, 
the missionaries preoccupied their medical attention on a single group, often favoring what 
they perceived as the marginalized position in society. They mostly served poorer Muslims 
who comprised a majority of the Gazan population and lacked alternative medical 
options.44 Beyond Gaza city, the medical missionaries took interest in reaching Muslims 
in villages as well as Bedouin tribes who would “travel several days journey to reach the 
medical mission.”45 Within these poor and rural populations, the missionaries were 
especially concerned with Muslim women.46  In CMS periodicals they repetitiously made 
known the need for female missionaries to reach Muslim women.47They regularly recorded 
stories of indifference women experienced in Gazan society to garner the support of their 
readership and encourage the participation of female missionaries in the medical mission. 
In one issue, an observer of the CMS hospital in Gaza writes:  
Poor little Narsara [presumably a young woman from a village near Gaza] has left 
us after a stay of three months in the Hospital. As her wrist would not heal, the 
doctor found the hand would have to be amputated, and, as her mother would not 
consent, she has gone to her home, two days’ journey distant. Her mother said, ‘She 
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would rather give her to the dogs than that she should lose a limb.” The doctor said, 
“She would probably die.” The mother replied, “let her die.”48  
 
The British missionaries preferred to treat and proselytize Muslim women with the 
assistance of Arab Christian physicians and missionaries. Surgeons, like Sterling, lacked 
fluency in Arabic so he would hire Arab Christians to work in the hospital and translate the 
gospel message of the British missionaries. Miriam Haddad, an Arab Christian from Syria, 
served in the hospital as a nurse during the late nineteenth century.49 The medical 
missionaries shared an intense preference for Christian staff members in the hospital, which 
often limited hiring opportunities as Gaza lacked a significant Christian population. 
Overall, medical missionaries targeted those who they perceived as subordinate in society. 
This preference developed into a twofold strategy. On the one hand, the missionaries 
offered an invaluable service to populations who lacked access to modern medical practices 
prior to the CMS hospital. On the other hand, the missionaries believed that poor, rural, 
and/or female members of Gazan society were more susceptible to the gospel message. 
The missionaries felt those with weak social ties, already socially isolated, would be more 
interested in the Christian message of redemption and transcendence. Missionary medicine 
consciously postured itself as the medicine of the downtrodden, not the elite.  
Offering medical care to Gazan women was a constant concern of missionary 
medicine. British missionaries prioritized developing separate men’s and women’s wards 
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within the CMS hospital. These wards provided the respective sexes with privacy but also 
allowed the missionaries to access the individual, separated from the family structure. 
However, in the early twentieth century, the missionaries were forced to eliminate the 
women’s ward. Once located on the upper floor of the hospital, furthest from the entrance, 
the ward needed to be dismantled due to structural issues in the hospital building.50 The 
single-floor hospital could not administer a women’s ward, so the missionaries raised 
support with their readership in the metropole. They wrote that they were limited in their 
ability to treat women at the hospital due to the lack of women’s ward and adequate female 
staff, which only included Haddad and two British missionaries.51 Without an adequate 
women’s ward, the female missionaries developed strategies to reach young women in 
Gazan society. They first established a new primary school within the hospital compound, 
which quickly attracted 400 girls and 50 boys.52 The hospital continued to admit a few 
female patients despite the lack of a women’s ward. The missionaries constantly adapted 
their medical services to both meet the needs of Gazan society and serve their interests of 
converting socially isolated patients. After employing these strategies for nearly a decade, 
the missionaries boasted that most converts to the Christian message were recruited from 
the young.53 Of this population, a significant number came from their work with women in 
the ward and primary school.  
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In addition to women, the medical missionaries targeted rural areas in the periphery 
of Gaza city. These areas initially attracted the British missionaries due to their sheer 
population. Sterling wrote that the population of “the city, villages, and Bedouins nearby 
is estimated at 150,000 to 200,000.”54 Of that total, the city comprised only a third with 
50,000 inhabitants. In the early twentieth century, the missionaries desired a new hospital 
building in Gaza and needed to increase their patient volume to justify large donations from 
the metropole. Sterling began to take several weeks a year to visit the rural areas and spread 
the news of the CMS hospital. In 1904, Sterling commenced “an itinerating tour among the 
Bedouin in the Wilderness of Beersheba” accompanied by “a newly baptized convert 
Selim, and a servant Ahmed.”55 As the missionaries traveled, they met with different tribes 
and set up a medical tent to perform out-patient operations.56 News of the medical mission 
attracted more patients from the villages and tribes to visit the hospital in the city. The 
missionaries recorded stories of Bedouins in a manner that disparaged the patriarchal 
oppression of the region. In one such incident they record:  
A dear little Bedouin woman, who has been with us now more than three months, 
came with a very bad tubercular knee; every effort was made to save it without 
amputating, but without success. On asking her why she did come before, she said 
she wanted to, but her people would not bring her until her cries and screams from 
the pain became such that they could stand her no longer. Her husband used to visit 
her every fortnight, and always seemed much disappointed to find she was still 
alive. He wanted to marry again but was afraid to do so until he knew something 
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As an afterthought the doctor notes that she “had much teaching [of the gospels] and fully 
believes and accepts what she has heard.”58 Anecdotes about serving the periphery of Gaza, 
paired with the statistics of treating rural patients, allowed the hospital to inflate its patient 
numbers and justify support from the metropole. Often, villagers and Bedouins who 
attended the hospital were not privy to the proselytizing methods of the missionaries before 
traveling to Gaza city.  
 To clarify, British missionary medicine still welcomed elite members of Gazan 
society despite dedicating their efforts toward marginalized patients. After operating in 
Gaza for nearly a decade, Sterling noted that most patients are poor but the “Effendi and 
Turkish soldiers also come for treatment.”59 In addition, these segments of Gazan society 
participated in the proselytizing efforts of the hospital to a certain extent. Sterling led 
prayers in the men’s ward where he recorded as many as forty-five persons who inhabited 
the space to hear the message. Several among those gathered were members of the effendi.60 
The term effendi described men of high education or social standing in the eastern 
Mediterranean. This segment of Gazan society had been the most vociferous in their 
opposition to missionary medicine a decade prior. However, the universal promise of 
missionary medicine, not technically limited to any segment of Gazan society, in addition 
to the availability and quality of CMS medical practices, led to the proliferation of 
missionary medical services in Gaza and its periphery. The medical missionaries desired 
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to inculcate support from all segments of Gazan society. With relative ease, they garnered 
support from the Ottoman government but needed to prove their services in Gaza to gain 
longstanding approval from the community; the benefit of their medical services needed to 
outweigh the societal disruption of their proselytism.  
 Missionary medicine, thus, differed significantly from colonial medicine and any 
conception of Palestinian or Egyptian medicine. The missionaries, in many ways, shared a 
similar lexicon as colonial medicine. Sterling described Gaza as a “land of fanaticism and 
prejudice [where] a hospital is surely the Gospel’s greatest and most easily grasped ‘object-
lesson.’” 61 The missionaries pointed out the superstitions of the people who, for instance, 
were averse to washing with water out of fear that their wounds could drink the water.62 
Despite their prejudices, they did not believe the Gazan body was inherently diseased.63 
They understood Gaza through the heart of the people, which they described as rock-hard 
“through the deadening power of Mohammedanism [sic].”64 Missionary medicine did not 
wish to control the body but rather the mind. Unlike colonial medicine, they did not 
technically limit their medical practices to certain segments of the population. Instead, they 
attended to pressure points in Gazan society for the sake of the mission. They described 
their evangelism strategy as a “sowing-time” over rocky ground, believing that the harvest 
would come with time.65 The only way to penetrate the Muslim heart, they wrote, was “by 
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the agency of the Medical Mission and by women’s work.”66 Similar to Palestinian or 
Egyptian medicine, the missionaries served and healed the people of Gaza and its periphery 
for the sake of their health and well-being. However, what separated missionary medicine 
was its unwavering belief that modern medicine was merely a means toward proselytizing 
ends. Modern medical practices, according to the missionaries, derived their salience from 
the Christian message and only served to point individuals toward the saving power of the 
gospel.  
Unfortunately, missionary records failed to give voice to their patients, recording 
their stories strictly for the benefit of the mission. In the anecdotal tales of Gazan patients, 
the missionaries clearly script the telling and interpretation of the story toward their British 
readership as in the aforementioned anecdotes of Narsara and the Bedouin woman. In the 
less subjective accounts, we find statistical evidence for the utility of the hospital. The 
British missionaries record that “The [hospital] beds are always full, and sometimes an 
overplus of a dozen or more lie on the floor on mats.”67 At the turn of the century, eye 
problems were the biggest issue amongst the Gazan people.68 “Between 500 and 600 
operations for trichiasis (operation on the eyelids) were done in 1900,” writes Sterling, 
“which in every case represents a saving of the sight and a cessation of pain and 
discomfort.” 69 In addition to eye problems, William Watson, a British traveler in Gaza, 
records patients suffering from “ulcers, abscesses, teeth, ears, malaria,” and other various 
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accidents.70 Accidents, injuries, and diseases that would otherwise lead to fatality, were 
treated and relieved at the missionary hospital. Despite opposition to the missionary 
message, their medicine became invaluable within Gazan society.  
The growing patient count, paired with a dilapidated hospital building, pushed the 
missionaries toward requesting funding for a more permanent medical mission. In 1900, 
Sterling recorded that the hospital had seen 1,200 in-patients (only 36 beds) and 28,390 
out-patients.71 Since 1896, in less than five years, the hospital had quadrupled its patient 
load but faced serious structural concerns. Due to the “very unsatisfactory condition” of 
the hospital, the missionaries found it necessary to disassemble its upper story which had 
housed the women’s ward.72 Sterling began to appeal to CMS supporters in the metropole, 
listing various examples for the significance of the medical mission to Gaza and beyond. 
In 1900, Sterling recorded patients from North Africa, Egypt, and Turkey who traveled 
many hours to visit the hospital, most of whom were pilgrims visiting Mecca and 
Jerusalem. He explains that the CMS hospital in Gaza was the only modern medical 
institution between Port Said and Jaffa, a seven days’ journey apart. Its location made it a 
direct caravan and pilgrimage route out of Egypt.73 He writes that the hospital was currently 
treating in-patients from “Persia, North Africa, villages six to ten hours distant, Bedouins, 
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and Gazans.”74 The strategic positioning of Gaza, between Palestine and Egypt, was the 
focus of Sterling’s appeal.  
 
Illustration 1: New CMS Hospital building in 1907.75 
Sterling requested a new hospital building for four years until his desires came to 
fruition. The hospital eventually received funding from William Watson of Newcastle who 
organized a fundraising drive to support the new construction in 1904. The following year, 
in 1905, the CMS received a second firman from the Ottoman government to commence 
construction.76 The new hospital building was completed in 1907, made from solid stone. 
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It faced east to west, receiving a significant breeze year-round.77 The breeze helped 
ventilate the hospital, which continued to make improvements. In 1912, a new out-patient 
block was added that the missionaries described as a “commodious and well-ventilated out-
patient hall.”78 The new structure, and developing hospital complex, allowed the 
missionaries to comfortably accommodate forty hospital beds. After the first year in the 
new hospital building, they saw 23,646 out-patients and performed 532 major operations, 
more than doubling the production of the CMS hospitals in Nablus and Salt.79 The new 
building assured the missionaries of their mission’s performance while attracting more 
patients from Gaza city.80 
After the erection of the new hospital building in 1907, British missionary medicine 
operated in Gaza much to the expectations of its leadership. To compensate for the new 
structure, the missionaries began to charge a small fee for admissions into the wards (in-
patient care). Sterling and his staff saw patients five days per week, setting aside each 
Saturday for major operations. The number of patients visiting the hospital continued to 
grow with 613 in-patients and 27,317 out-patients in 1909.81 Vision problems continued to 
comprise the majority of patient care. Sterling writes, “A particularly distressing feature of 
the medical work this autumn has been the number of patients coming daily with partial 
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and complete loss of sight owning to the prevalence of a severe form of ophthalmia.”82 
With new surgical techniques and equipment, the missionaries treated many patients 
suffering from partial or total blindness, comparing their medical success to their 
evangelical prowess. Sterling, an ordained minister before receiving a medical education, 
always saw medicine as a means towards evangelical ends. British missionaries like 
Sterling believed they assisted in returning sight to the blind in more ways than one. In 
terms of “seeing” and believing the missionary message, they recorded “eighteen baptisms 
of converts from among the Moslems and one Jew since the Medical Mission was 
founded.”83 Between 1907 and 1914, the CMS hospital in Gaza operated exactly as the 
medical missionaries intended. Paraphrasing the sentiment of the missionaries, the medical 
institution healed the physically and spiritually blind, opening their eyes to the saving 
power of the gospel message and modern medicine.  
The outbreak of war in 1914 put missionary medicine in Gaza on a temporary 
hiatus. Leading up to the war, the CMS hospital limited in-patient care and focused on out-
patients.84 In 1915, twenty-five CMS missionaries were imprisoned in the Ottoman 
Empire. Six of whom were imprisoned in Palestine, including “Dr. Sterling of Gaza [who 
was] actually kept in prison for several days.”85 Eventually, Sterling and the other CMS 
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missionaries were released at the behest of the America Consul in Jerusalem.86 Upon 
release, they escaped custody through Egypt. The only CMS missionary who remained in 
Palestine during the war was at the CMS Orphanage in Nazareth.87 The war represented a 
severe, yet temporary, disruption to missionary medicine in Gaza. 
After the war, the CMS hospital in Gaza mirrored the city in its destruction. The 
Ottoman military controlled and administered the hospital when the CMS missionaries fled 
Palestine. It continued to offer significant medical relief to those in Gaza city and its 
periphery until the Third Battle of Gaza starting 1 November 1917. Under pressure from 
British forces, Ottoman troops dismantled the hospital and used its ceilings to build iron 
girders for trenches.88 British forces eventually broke the Ottoman defense lines and 
occupied Gaza on 7 November. The occupation allowed CMS missionaries to return to 
Palestine in 1917, but the British military dissuaded civilians from entering Gaza until 
1919. When the CMS missionaries first viewed Gaza, they wrote upon their arrival: “Gaza 
has been the sacrifice of Palestine. The city has been left without an inhabitant.”89 With the 
hospital complex in ruins, the missionaries used their out-station in the village of Mejdel, 
ten miles north of Gaza, to continue medical services.90 While the CMS medical 
missionaries worked at the out-station in Mejdel, the Syrian and Palestine Relief Fund 
attended to the CMS hospital in Gaza. It “put up some mud roofs over the least damaged 
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rooms…and decided to rebuild part of the out-patient block for accommodation for the 
staff on their arrival.” 91 The missionaries, with support from British relief efforts, sought 
to reassert themselves as the primary medical providers in Gaza. 
The CMS hospital in Gaza resumed operations in December 1919 under the same 
pretenses of the prewar institution. Sterling died in 1917 before returning to Gaza, but his 
son, also named Dr. R.G. Sterling, resumed the medical mission.92 When the younger 
Sterling arrived in Gaza on 4 December 1919 he began treating out-patients immediately. 
He converted the old CMS church into the men’s ward, one of the CMS school rooms into 
the women’s ward, and another school room into the operating theatre.93 Sterling described 
the condition of the hospital structure following the war: 
Only the shell of the old building remained, and even that had nearly all to be pulled 
down owing to serious cracks in the walls, but luckily the foundations which were 
exceptionally good were unharmed, and this has saved a big expense.94  
 
 
By 1921, Sterling and his staff were still only treating a few patients, comparative to the 
previous capacity of the hospital, with 20 beds, 89 in-patients, and 7,148 out-patients for 
the year.95 The medical mission lacked the financial resources to restore operations to its 
prewar level, prompting the missionaries to ally themselves with governing powers in 
Gaza.  
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The medical missionaries turned to the British government in Palestine following 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and a lack of sufficient financial support from their 
donors. The missionaries first received medicine and surgical supplies through the British 
Red Cross, but rebuilding the hospital seemed impossible due to the shortage of material 
and high prices in Gaza.96 The fortunes of the hospital changed when Sir Richard Harman 
Luce, the Director of Medical Services in the Palestine Campaign, identified the CMS 
hospital as an integral part of the rebuilding process in Gaza.97 He promised that the 
hospital would be “well-patronized” as it was the city’s only general hospital.98 With 
financial backing from the British government, the ground floor of the hospital was 
refurbished and a new operating theatre erected.99 By 1925, a new women’s ward was 
completed along with electric lights powered by an on-site engine room. The former 
women’s ward, converted into an isolation room, raised the bed count to sixty-three, more 
than tripling the operating capacity of the hospital.100 
Financial aid from the British government began to transform the nature of 
missionary medicine in Gaza, as the CMS hospital conformed to government interests. The 
British Mandatory government established a military hospital in Gaza, which treated 
British soldiers exclusively. At times, the government would ask the CMS hospital to treat 
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British soldiers and government officials to aid the Mandatory hospital. However, the 
missionaries never recorded the Mandatory hospital assisting with their Palestinian patients 
creating an imbalance of patient care. One missionary described the impact on the CMS 
hospital, “This has meant very busy work, and overflowing wards, patients having had to 
be accommodated in the verandas. No needy patient has ever had to be refused. The 
Government have given generous grants to meet the added expense involved.”101 In 1923, 
the hospital received approval from the Mandatory government to offer a nursing school. 
However, it was required to implement a government-approved syllabus.102 Although the 
missionaries developed a close reliance upon the Mandatory government, they attempted 
to maintain their Christian identity. The nurses were all “Christians—some Protestant, 
some Greek”103comprised of Arabs and some Armenians, many of whom had been raised 
in British missionary orphanages.104 The hospital maintained a Christian staff, led by 
British doctors and made possible through the services of Arab and Armenian nurses.  
After the war, the missionaries noted a heightened sense of distrust for missionary 
medicine among the Muslims of Gaza city, so the missionaries made serving the villages a 
priority. Miss Cooper, a CMS missionary stationed in Gaza, writes:  
Most of our patients are villagers, and wandering Arabs. They are very grateful for 
all that is done for them, but they are slow to learn anything new, and some of them 
do not want to learn; they tell us plainly that they are afraid that we are going to 
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make them Christians, and when they go back to their villages they will be beaten 
by their husbands.105  
 
 
While the residents of Gaza city had grown wary to the missionaries’ proselytizing efforts, 
the missionaries found villagers and Bedouins to be more willing participants in the 
mission. On a bi-weekly basis, British physicians and Arab evangelists would itinerate in 
the surrounding villages. In 1926, the hospital staff spent twenty-six days traveling during 
which they visited thirty villages.106 In addition to providing out-patient services, the 
hospital staff would inform the villagers of the medical capabilities of the hospital, hoping 
to draw their sick and injured out of the villages and into the care of the missionary hospital.  
In the late 1920s, the CMS missionaries described their hospital as rebuilt and 
reestablished as a center for missionary medicine in Gaza. In 1928, Sterling left the hospital 
after completing many of the essential repairs, transferring to the CMS hospital in Jaffa. 
He was replaced by Dr. A.R. Hargreaves, another British missionary physician who 
previously served at several CMS hospitals, in March 1929.107 In 1932, the missionaries 
described the hospital compound as reaching its full potential as a complete “mission 
unit.”108 By this time they had established a renewed primary school, after repairing the 
ruins of the old school building, and a church room for the evangelical congregation. To 
encapsulate their accomplishments, the missionaries renamed the hospital, now the Sterling 
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Memorial Hospital, to honor the influence of the Sterling family on maintaining the 
medical primacy of the CMS hospital in Gaza. At this point, the missionaries could project 
a clear imagining for the present and future of missionary medicine in Gaza.  
British missionary medicine sought to treat the body, mind, and spirit of Gazan 
society, but Islam and the family unit proved the largest obstacles preventing these 
aspirations. The missionaries saw the dominance of British rule in Palestine as the battering 
ram for breaking the power of Islam in the region. Beyond Palestine, the missionaries 
perceived the efforts of the British Empire as synonymous with their own mission. 
Hargreaves writes: 
Within the British Empire there has been established in every country a government 
medical service which is planned to be nation-wide and free. Consequently much 
medical work which formerly was undertaken by missionaries is now undertaken 
by the government.”109  
 
Rather than perceiving the absorption of missionary medicine into British colonial 
medicine as a dilution of the Christian message, Hargreaves held that the British 
government was the continued expansion of “Christian civilization.”110 Missionary 
medicine had paved the way, setting the example for the medical infrastructure which 
would transform Palestine, and other regions of British subjection, into an extension of 
“Christian civilization.” Missionary medicine achieved this goal by breaking down 
“recalcitrant” family bonds in these “uncivilized regions.”111 When a patient entered the 
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missionary hospital, they became physically distant from the family. One missionary wrote 
that outside of the family, patients would “thrive better with individual hospital care.”112 
Within the hospital, the missionaries dispersed men and women into separate wards in 
which they could isolate individuals, at moments of physical weakness, an introduce them 
to the saving power of modern medicine and the Christian message. True healing of the 
body, mind, and spirit, the missionaries claimed, arose from the all-encompassing practices 
of missionary medicine. 
 Despite the missionary desire for civilizational transformation via the agency of the 
mission hospital, Gazan society rejected their efforts. In the early 1930s, the missionaries 
noted general instability in the political situation. Resistance to the British Mandatory 
government made Arabs hesitant to visit the CMS hospital.113 At first, the missionaries 
described this hesitancy as stemming from issues beyond the hospital, “amid the bad 
feeling aroused through clashes between the military and police authorities on the one side, 
and inhabitants of the town on the other, the hospital is a neutral ground of peace and 
goodwill.”114 The perception of the hospital as a neutral ground, however, did not mirror 
reality. In 1932, Palestinians in Gaza boycotted the hospital following the conversion of a 
young Muslim within the complex.115 In response to the conflict, and distrust of the British 
medical missionaries, the hospital hired Dr. Muir Waheed of Beirut. The missionaries 
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described their new physician as a local “Palestinian doctor” who took full responsibility 
for the hospital when the British missionaries left in 1937 due to the Arab revolts.116 
Hospital operations continued under Dr. Waheed during the Second World War, when 
British physicians, nurses, and staff members remained in the metropole. 
When British missionaries returned to Gaza after the Second World War, they 
discovered a Gazan society that no longer adhered to their stagnant conceptions. British 
missionaries had once divided Gazan society into binaries, taking advantage of those with 
weaker social ties for the sake of proselytism. In 1946, the missionaries noted several 
transformations that jeopardized their operations. They witnessed the growth of Arab 
nationalism that united Arab Muslims and Christians under the banner of anti-Zionism.117 
From the missionary perspective, Arab Christians no longer invested their efforts in sharing 
the gospel with their Muslim neighbors. They also found a rise in what they described as 
“communist propaganda,” noting a widespread admiration for the policies of the Soviet 
Union.118 Most disheartening, the missionaries recorded that “a number whose parents and 
grandparents were Christians…are now Moslems, largely because of the lack of regular, 
systematic Christian instruction.”119 The differences between Muslims and Christians that 
the missionaries had once exploited disappeared under shared national ambitions. 
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Missionary medicine in Gaza began to lose its salience within a society no longer 
susceptible to missionary exploitation.  
The CMS hospital anticipated difficulties following the termination of the British 
Mandate, but it also saw the impending moment as an opportunity to redefine missionary 
medicine in Gaza. Months prior to the outbreak of war, the missionaries noted “Dark 
clouds…piling up on the political horizon.”120 The British missionaries remained hopeful, 
however, that the end of the British Mandate would allow them to disassociate with the 
British government and return to the politically flexible status of missionary medicine. One 
missionary wrote, “the hospital ought to be at full strength. When the British Government 
gives up the Mandate, the the [sic] missionary workers will have even more responsibility 
and opportunities than ever.”121 Since the end of the First World War, the CMS hospital in 
Gaza had operated effectively under the British Mandate, with only a small degree of 
separation. Nonetheless, missionary medicine continued to differentiate itself from British 
colonial medicine by blatantly insisting on the primacy of proselytism over medical care. 
With the end of the British Mandate, the CMS lost significant financial support but 
anticipated new opportunities for missionary medicine.  
By 1949, the CMS hospital became overwhelmed with the medical responsibility 
of treating Palestinian refugees who had fled to Gaza in order to escape the war on 
Palestine. The missionaries, regarding the refugee crisis, wrote “The strain imposed on an 
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already depleted staff was most exacting, and the financial crisis very serious.” 122 The 
CMS hospital in Gaza not only lost financial support from the British Mandate, but it was 
isolated from its CMS hospital network in Palestine. The withdrawal of the British Mandate 
meant the cessation of all CMS stations in the newly formed Israel.123 The CMS realigned 
its mission in Gaza with their efforts in Egypt, but it took time to develop medical supply 
chains.124 The strain forced the missionaries to search for new sources of financial support, 
which initially came in the form of an agreement with the American Friends Service 
Committee.125 Later, the hospital came to an agreement with the United Nations’ (UN) 
relief efforts in Palestine. The CMS struggled to redefine its evangelical efforts in the midst 
of taxing medical strain.  
The agreements with the UN and American Friends as well as the developing 
political situation in Gaza, overturned the evangelical calculus of the mission. The CMS 
missionaries explained, “Ward services have been stopped, as our agreement with the 
Quakers [American Friends] includes the U.N. prohibition on such activities.”126 Ward 
evangelism, the centerpiece of British missionary medicine in Gaza, came to an 
unceremonious end. While the missionaries tried to maintain some degree of private 
evangelism, they ceased their public efforts.127 The war on Palestine, and subsequent 
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political boundaries, brought new difficulties in crossing beyond the bounds of Gaza city. 
The CMS hospital was effectively cut off from the villages.128 One missionary summarized 
the new situation:  
From being a little mission hospital serving the 66 villages of South Palestine and 
competing with Govt. institutions in the town and further afield, we have become 
the central point for all refugee work among the quarter million people of the nine 
camps and the crowed home town….Only a few months back we considered 20 as 
a big number to be seen as out-patients, but now Doctor must give orders to limit 
the giving of cards if she doesn’t want to have to deal with 300 or more.129 
 
 
The methods in which British missionary medicine targeted Gazan society, by focusing on 
rural populations and evangelizing women in the ward, were no longer available. The CMS 
hospital had little time to adapt its evangelism strategies as the demands of the refugee 
crisis grew larger. The number of out-patients the hospital once treated in a year became 
the monthly count.130 This precarious and overwhelming level of hospital care was not 
sustainable. The CMS missionaries in Gaza were barely kept afloat by shipments of 
medical supplies from the CMS hospitals in Egypt and the financial support of the UN and 
American Friends. 
In the early 1950s, the CMS conceded that its ambitions for missionary medicine 
in Gaza had reached their end. The political situation in Egypt, following the Free Officers 
Coup of 1952, made the future of missionary medicine in Egypt, and by extension Gaza, 
tenuous. The CMS noted that all hospital bills were currently paid by the UN, but they 
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believed this arrangement to be temporary.131 Unable to subsidize long-term medical in the 
hospital, the CMS looked to sell the institution. It desired to maintain the Christian witness, 
which became possible when the Foreign Mission Board (FMB) of the American Southern 
Baptist Convention (SBC) took interest in the hospital.132 Baptist missionaries began to 
work in the hospital in 1952 and then, in 1954, the CMS formerly sold its hospital to the 
FMB.133 The CMS described the end of their mission in Gaza in the following way: “The 
hospital, now handed over to the Southern Baptists, is continuing as a Christian missionary 
institution, carrying the tradition of the past, though in a different tradition of 
churchmanship.”134 The CMS hoped that the FMB might continue its legacy of missionary 
medicine within an ever changing Gazan society.  
*** 
 Although missionary medicine in Gaza often relied on British colonial power, both 
in the late-nineteenth century and during the British Mandate, it forged a unique strategy 
for medical care. Missionary medicine adapted to existing power structures, whether 
British, Ottoman, or local, to offer medical services while maintaining its proselytism. 
Missionary medicine was offered to the entire Gazan population, yet it consciously 
postured itself as the medicine of the marginalized. It saw rural, poor, and female members 
of Gazan society as the ideal candidates for patient care. Neither “encalvist” in practice nor 
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universal in intention, missionary medicine existed somewhere between colonial medicine 
and a conception of local or national medicine.135 Resilient and adaptive, it preserved a 
status quo that Gazan society neither wholly welcomed nor rejected due to the ambivalent 
nature of its medical and evangelical practices. When the CMS sold the medical institution 
to the FMB in 1954, the new mission organization continued the ambivalent practices of 
missionary medicine. The sustained practices of missionary medicine into the twentieth 
century, allow me to describe the mission hospital, in subsequent chapters, as a “site of 
ambivalence,” which necessitated a response from Gazan society due to its polarizing 
practices.  
 The interaction between the CMS hospital and Gazan society serves witness to 
significant transformations during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 
Typically, Anglo-American missionaries depicted eastern Mediterranean society on a 
religious basis, categorizing its inhabitants within the rigid categories of Muslim, Christian, 
and Jew. Due to the demographics of Gaza, which lacked a significant Christian 
population, British missionaries at the CMS hospital defined Gazan society through class, 
geography, and gender. They derived their missionary medicine from these categories, 
which they attempted to bifurcate and exploit for the benefit of their evangelical efforts. 
The missionaries endeavored to define the essence of Gazan society, which proved an 
elusive and futile task. These rigid depictions were categorically overturned as Gazan 
society coalesced under the sentiments of anti-Zionism and anti-colonialism. Gazan 
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Muslims and Christians, long bifurcated and exploited by colonialism and missionary 
medicine, renewed a sense of ulfa (concord, familiarity) under the tremendous pressure of 
war and conflict in Palestine.136 The CMS hospital failed to separate itself from the British 
colonial legacy, and ceased to exist by 1954. However, the mission hospital in Gaza 
continued under American missionaries who employed new forms of missionary medicine 
with the tacit support of the UN and Egyptian Administration. 
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Chapter II 
The defining moments in twentieth-century Gaza—the abolition of the Ottoman 
Sultanate and formation of the British Mandate in 1922; the atrocities of al-nakba (the 
catastrophe) in 1948; and the consternation of al-naksa (the setback) in 1967—demand 
scholarly attention. Recent work, however, has focused on the in-between moments, 
tracing the quotidian experiences of the people and institutions.137 These accounts do not 
intend to decentralize nor depoliticize the defining moments in Palestinian history but 
rather give new meaning to how individuals and institutions managed change, loss, and 
destruction. This approached is exemplified by Ilana Feldman in Governing Gaza in which 
she argues that bureaucratic practices legitimated authority despite political ruptures 
between 1917 and 1967.138 This chapter follows Feldman’s lead, locating practices that 
legitimated authority in Gaza during the Egyptian Administration (1948-1967).  
To locate these practices, this chapter employs original archival material, the 
mission records and correspondence of the Gaza Baptist Hospital (1954-1967).139 Inspired 
by Ussama Makdisi and Beth Baron, this chapter works through the mission hospital to 
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analyze Gazan society under the Egyptian Administration.140 It describes the mission 
hospital, with its medical and evangelical practices, as a site of ambivalence that both 
benefited and disrupted Gazan society.141 A site of ambivalence maintains contradictory 
features, in this case an institution committed to medicine and proselytism, that ensure its 
permanence while preserving its imposition. Authorities in Gaza—such as landowners, the 
Egyptian Administration, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)— 
responded inconsistently to this imposition, betraying the nature and capacity of their own 
legitimacy. 
Analyzing responses to the mission hospital elucidates two legitimating practices: 
medical care and property ownership. Examining the former unveils the dynamic 
relationship between the mission hospital, Egyptian Administration, and UNRWA. The 
mission hospital, like the Administration and Agency, legitimated its authority in Gaza 
based on practices deemed valuable—medical treatments.142 Concurrently, propertied 
Gazans disputed with the medical missionaries over the rightful owners of the mission 
hospital’s land. The property dispute evidences the legitimating yet restrained practice of 
land ownership during this period.  
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As the missionaries recorded medical statistics, documented property disputes, and 
contemplated their evangelical successes and failures, the contours of Gazan society 
emerged between the lines of their records and correspondence. Read carefully, the hospital 
records reveal the daily experience of Gazans under the Egyptian Administration. 
Therefore, through the lens of the mission hospital, I argue that propertied Gazan sought 
authority through landownership, while the Egyptian Administration and UNRWA 
claimed authority through the medical treatment of Palestinian refugees in Gaza.   
*** 
By 1953, the UNRWA had observed Gaza for four years and recognized the need for 
continued humanitarian efforts. The Agency stated the obvious: the Gaza Strip was too 
small and barren even for its original population.143 Due to the diminished hinterland and 
influx of 200,000 refugees, who comprised over two-thirds of the population, rehabilitation 
seemed impossible.144 The need for humanitarian efforts was met with the tenacity of the 
Foreign Mission Board (FMB), the mission organization of the American Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC). In 1953 George Sadler, a member of the FMB executive committee, 
wrote Canon Max Warren of the CMS to inquire about purchasing the Sterling Memorial 
Hospital.145 The FMB had established missions, both educational and medical, in Jordan, 
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Lebanon, and Israel. For them, establishing a mission in Gaza not only expanded their 
influence in Palestine but offered the possibility of mission work in Egypt due to the 
impending future of the Gaza Strip. The FMB was willing to staff the hospital in Gaza but 
did not have the financial resources to fund operations, therefore they reached out to the 
UNRWA. On 8 February 1954, the responsibility for operating the hospital transferred 
from the CMS to the FMB.146 The agreement was predicated on the UNRWA’s offer to 
contribute $100,000 annually for operations. The FMB, for their part, provided $10,000 
annually for operations as well as the salaries for hospital staff.147 While the FMB 
controlled hospital operations, the UNRWA directed its focus, instructing the FMB to serve 
Palestinian refugees living in the mu’askerat (military camps) of Khan Younis and 
Rafah.148 When the FMB assumed responsibility for the hospital it was already one of the 
largest surgical centers in Gaza, and likely performed a third of all general operations 
during the 1950s.149 The UNRWA entrusted the FMB with the responsibility of treating a 
large proportion of the refugee population, a population that grew significantly over time. 
While the hospital offered significant medical relief, its leadership envisioned it as 
a source of spiritual healing as well. The CMS established the hospital as a site of 
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evangelical modernity and hoped to continue their legacy through the FMB. Before selling 
the hospital to the FMB, the CMS noted the weakness of the Gazan congregation but trusted 
the Southern Baptists to serve the local population while continuing to welcome Anglican 
clergy.150 The FMB, on the other hand, had no intention of maintaining the Anglican 
presence in Gaza.151 They saw the CMS hospital as an evangelical failure with few 
confessions of faith and only two baptisms during its century-long tenure.152 The FMB 
desired to rewrite the history of the hospital, beginning with a new name, the Gaza Baptist 
Hospital. They intended to revamp its evangelical potential by using it as the epicenter for 
numerous ministries.  
The first FMB missionaries in Gaza, led by Dr. J.T. McRae, arrived with a road 
map for the mission. They set their eyes on constructing a nursing school, maternity center, 
and additional operating room.153 They recognized the impossibility of public preaching, 
as proselytism was illegal in Gaza, but saw an opportunity to reach patients in a “bed to 
bed” ministry and weekly Sunday School.154 Both British and American missionaries 
ignored local prohibitions on proselytism, but the FMB missionaries believed the CMS was 
too conservative in their approach. Rather than relegate proselytism to the private hospital 
wards, the FMB envisioned new avenues for evangelism. They quickly established a 
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nursing program, the first and only nursing program in Gaza.155 In addition, the FMB 
inherited an elementary school from the CMS with a kindergarten and two grades of 125 
students.156 The missionaries saw unlimited potential for the mission, but knew evangelical 
success would take time. Dr. McRae believed that local Arab evangelists were key to 
utilizing the full potential of the hospital and school. He and other FMB missionaries, 
however, were hesitant about the reliability of local Arab Christians, concerned that they 
lacked the subtlety to operate effectively in Gaza.157 The missionaries envisaged the 
hospital as a permanent fixture in Gazan society, hoping to establish a quid pro quo in 
which patients tolerated evangelism in exchange for medical treatment.  
During the early years of the FMB mission to Gaza, the missionaries were more 
concerned about societal acceptance than the UNRWA’s approval. The Agency permitted 
Christian proselytism as long as it did not undermine the local government.158 In fact, the 
Agency supported numerous Christian missions to work amongst Palestinian refugees. The 
medical and educational services of Christian missionaries apparently outweighed their 
potential for societal disruption. The UNRWA desired “practical philanthropy”—a term 
Melanie Tanielian uses to describe charitable work that eventually breaks the relationship 
between giver and recipient—to create self-sufficient contributors from the Palestinian 
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refugee population.159 The Agency assumed that Christian missions would provide services 
and employment opportunities for Palestinian refugees. Against its wishes, however, many 
missions like the FMB preferred evangelical staff members over Muslims who comprised 
nearly 98% of the Gazan population. To improve the ratio of evangelical staff members, 
the FMB initiated an exchange program sending nurses from their hospitals in Jordan and 
Lebanon to Gaza.160 The UNRWA did little to ensure the hiring of Palestinians in Gaza, 
and the FMB maintained that the refugee population was unfit for employment without 
proper training.161 In fact, “distributive charity,” ensuring a continuous relationship 
between recipient and giver,  advantaged Christian missions in Gaza who directly benefited 
from the refugee need for medical care.162  From the perspective of the Palestinians in 
Gaza, neither the Baptist hospital nor the UNRWA adequately addressed local concerns. 
Despite initial optimism, the medical and evangelical aspirations of the mission 
hospital were quickly jeopardized as the Egyptian Administration took greater control of 
Gazan land. During the early 1950s, the Administration assumed responsibility for Gaza’s 
charitable endowments or awqāf (singular waqf), naming the Egyptian military governor 
of Gaza as head of the local waqf committee. The Administration took further control of 
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Gazan awqāf in 1954, eliminating waqf al-dhurri (the family endowment).163 The 
dissolution of family endowments disrupted Gazan society, shifting power from the local 
waqf committee to the individual Gazans who now owned these properties. The decision 
also profoundly impacted the mission hospital as two-thirds of its property were deemed 
waqf dhurri and disturbed to private owners. Gazan courts deliberated whether the land 
belonged to the hospital or the waqf inheritors, a decision the FMB missionaries feared 
would imperil their mission. Following the decision, Dr. McRae wrote desperately in the 
annual station report, “No Baptist Church, no conversions to our knowledge, no new 
mission stations…the Government does not want us in Gaza and we have no assurance that 
we will be here next month.”164 Without support from the Administration, the impending 
court decision loomed over the future of the medical mission.   
In 1955, after working in Gaza for a single year, the FMB missionaries feared an 
abrupt end. In the annual station report Dr. McRae wrote desperately, “No Baptist Church, 
no conversions to our knowledge, no new mission stations…the Government does not want 
us in Gaza and we have no assurance that we will be here next month.”165 Though the 
mission elementary school doubled to 250 pupils, it proved a Pyrrhic victory. Soon 
afterwards Egyptian law required teaching the Qur’an in Gazan schools; the FMB decided 
to close the elementary in response. 166 The same year the Egyptian Administration 
 
163 The abolition of waqf dhurri in Gaza was an extension of the Egyptian decision to 
abolish waqf ahli in Egypt. The two terms are tantamount in meaning. Dumper, “Forty 
Years without Slumbering,” 178–179. 
164 J.T. McRae, 1955 Gaza Station Report (Gaza: Arab Baptist Mission, 1955), 16, IMB. 
165 J.T. McRae, 1955 Gaza Station Report (Gaza: Arab Baptist Mission, 1955), 16, IMB. 
166 James B. Young, 1956 Gaza Mission Report (Gaza: Arab Baptist Mission, 1956), 1, IMB. 
 54 
restricted Muslims from attending Sunday School classes.167 In defeat, Dr. McRae 
described the experience with Ephesians 6:12: “For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, 
but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, 
against spiritual wickedness in high places.”168 Unbeknownst to the medical missionaries 
they would soon face more darkness—war.   
After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, France, Britain, and Israel readied for war. On 29 October, 
Israel initiated the 1956 Suez Crisis by invading Gaza with the intent to eradicate 
opposition, which often resulted in the summary execution of civilians.169 During the four-
month occupation, the government hospital in Gaza, Al-Shifa, was abandoned. At the 
request of the UNRWA, the FMB medical missionaries assumed responsibility for both 
their own hospital and Al-Shifa where they treated patients and maintained over 200-
beds.170 The FMB sent doctors from their hospital in Ajlun to help with the increased 
operating load. From early November to mid-December, the Baptist doctors and nurses 
performed the majority of general operations in Gaza. They noted many atrocities as they 
treated hundreds of Palestinians who lost fingers, hands, and eyes due to the conflict.171 
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War brought quick change for the medical missionaries who now felt indispensable after 
once fearing an abrupt end in 1955. 
In response to the war, the United Nations General Assembly announced the 
creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on 7 November 1956. The UNEF 
sought to secure a resolution to the conflict, beginning with the removal of French and 
British forces from the Suez Canal. By March 1957, the UNEF had entered Gaza where 
thousands cheered their arrival, reported Dr. James Young, the superintendent of the 
Baptist hospital during the occupation.172 The content of the cheers, however, evaded Dr. 
Young’s records as the people welcomed the return of the Egyptian Administration rather 
than the UNEF, chanting “down with the Eisenhower Doctrine,” “we want Egypt,” “long-
live Abdel Nasser,” and “Egypt is our mother.”173 Despite the chants of the people and 
UNEF pressure, the Israeli forces remained in Gaza for a tense period: 
One day after the conquest of Gaza an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] officer entered 
the hospital compound and began demanding something of Dr. [James] Young in 
Hebrew. Not knowing the language, Dr. Young was trying to puzzle out the 
officer’s meaning just as one of the Arab doctors came by and said, “Hello,” to 
the pair. This was the wrong thing to do as it turned out. The Israeli officer, in a 
sudden fury, took a notion to start whacking the Arab doctor with his swagger 
stick. As the officer bore down on the doctor, Dr. Young leaped between then and 
tried to push the Israeli officer away. The escorting IDF soldiers then jumped on 
Dr. Young, accusing him of striking an Israeli officer (an offense punishable, 
presumably, by facing a firing squad at sunrise). Dr. Young was attempting to 
explain that he had not hit anyone but was only trying to prevent the Israeli officer 
from beating the doctor, when rescue arrive. Col. Maurice Brown, commander of 
the contingent of United Nations Forces in Gaza, drove up in his Jeep and 
demanded an explanation. After pulling the Israelis off Dr. Young, Col. Brown 
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The UNEF soldiers, whom historian Jean-Pierre Filiu likens to American soldiers with 
light blue painted over stars and stripes, applauded the Baptist medical missionaries and 
participated in their mission.175  The missionaries reported that UNEF personnel attended 
their Sunday services, which had resumed during the Israeli occupation.176 While members 
of the UNEF enjoyed the mission services of the Baptists, the UN cared more for their 
medical practices that legitimated their authority. The UNRWA made sure to note the 
successful treatment of many refugee patients despite war.177 The international authority 
of the UN was not established by “liberating” Gaza from Israeli occupation, but instead by 
practices of medicine extended towards Palestinian refugees. 
The restored Egyptian Administration in Gaza also saw the value of medical 
practices. When Nasser traveled to Gaza in 1957, he visited the Baptist hospital and 
“expressed his appreciation for the care given to the wounded.” 178 He walked through the 
hospital, stopping: 
by the bedside of an old refugee who had just undergone a suprapubic 
prostatectomy. He asked the man his name and then said, “Is there anything I can 
do for you?” The man replied, “I need an enema.” Abdul Nasser laughed and 
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Perhaps apocryphal, but the anecdote serves as poignant illustration of the struggle for 
authority in Gaza. Nasser visited the Baptist hospital, both approbating its medicine and 
condoning its blatant proselytism, for the sake of Palestinian refugees. He approached the 
bedside of a refugee patient and asked him a question expressing his care. However, the 
patient’s practical and vulgar answer betrayed the rhetorical nature of the question. Nasser 
laughed and resumed his walk, reminding the patient and hospital staff that their services 
would remain a medical statistic in the struggle for authority in Gaza. 
After Gaza returned to Egyptian control in 1957, the partnership between Egypt 
and the UNRWA crumbled as Nasser sought regional authority. The restored Egyptian 
Administration immediately appointed Major General Mohammad Hassan ‘Abd al-Latif 
to govern Gaza. The administration then instituted the Health Services Department of Gaza 
(da’irat al-khadamat as-sihiya) and appointed Dr. Haīdar ‘Abd al-Shāfī, a Palestinian 
physician born in Gaza, to serve as the director. The new health department quickly 
challenged the UN by seizing control of the UNEF hospital, a 70-bed refugee medical 
center.180 Egypt also decided to no longer recognize the legal status of the UNRWA and 
denied Agency staff permission to enter Gaza.181 This alarmed the UNRWA who made the 
situation clear at the 1958 General Assembly: 
It must again be reported, with regret, that the Agency has continued to encounter 
serious difficulties as a result of the apparent unwillingness of the Egyptian 
authorities to recognize the status of the Agency as a subsidiary organ of the 
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United Nations, or to accord to the Agency the privileges and immunities which 
flow from that status, and which are necessary for the fulfilment of its duties.182 
 
 
Although the UNRWA continued to operate in Gaza, it faced various constrictions from 
the Egyptian Administration during the late-1950s and 1960s. Nasser took advantage of 
these restrictions to seize medical authority from the UNRWA, a significant step towards 
legitimating his pan-Arab authority. Nasser’s authoritative reputation led to the formation 
of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt, Syria, and occupied Gaza on 1 
February 1958. Essential to Nasser’s credibility as leader of the new pan-Arab state was 
his stance on the Palestinian refugee situation. With increasing control of health services 
in Gaza, the newly formed UAR under Nasser derived authority through its medical 
treatment of Palestinian refugees.  
 Nonetheless, the medical legitimacy of the UAR in Gaza was complicated by the 
Baptist hospital as its missionaries became increasingly aggressive in their proselytism. Ed 
Nicholas, the first ordained Baptist minister in Gaza, organized the Gaza Baptist Church in 
1959.183 Nicholas cleared out the old Anglican sanctuary, replacing the pulpit and pews 
with a baptistry and curtains.184 More so than patients in the hospital, he identified the 
nursing school as the most promising site for evangelism. The nursing school, as a matter 
of fact, proved controversial in 1959. In what the missionaries described as retaliation for 
firing a Muslim nurse, the Egyptian Administration deported a female nurse.185 The 
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missionaries deployed gender and religion in the conflict.186 They broadcasted the 
intolerance of the Administration who expelled an “innocent female nurse” because they 
fired a male Muslim nurse guilty of disorderly conduct.187 Amidst the nurse controversy, 
‘Abd al-Latif summoned Dr. David Dorr, the new superintendent of the Baptist hospital, 
and Nicholas to meet. He told the missionaries to cease preaching and focus on their 
medical responsibilities. He also objected to the “Baptist” name of the hospital, calling it 
too religious.188 The missionaries initially believed the meeting was the pretext for their 
expulsion from Gaza. Considering the Egyptian Administration’s seizure of the UNEF 
hospital in 1957, the missionaries feared the Administration would soon find justification 
to expropriate their hospital. 
 Nevertheless, the FMB missionaries were not expelled by the Egyptian 
Administration, and they believed the people of Gaza played a part in their permanence. 
One missionary noted support from Abu Ali, a guard at al-Shifa with connections to 
smugglers in Gaza. Described as a “Mafiosa [sic] don” Abu Ali and his “cronies” 
advocated for the work of the Baptist hospital and afterwards “threats to close down the 
institution withered away.”189 While the story of Mafioso Abu Ali sounds too good to be 
true, multiple sources speak to the ambivalent response of Palestinians towards the FMB 
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missionaries. Farra Sarraf, the hospital lawyer, informed the FMB missionaries that many 
Palestinians supported the idea of a church within the hospital but not a hospital within the 
church.190 At one point congregants from the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic 
churches of Gaza attended Baptist services when their respective congregations lacked a 
priest.191 But later when the Roman Catholic church received a priest, he and his 
congregation repudiated the work of the Baptist mission.192 Christians, nonetheless, made 
up less than two percent of the population in Gaza. As far as the Baptist missionaries were 
concerned, the opinion of the Muslim population was more crucial. The missionaries 
continued to invite Muslims to their weekly Sunday Schools until the Administration 
categorized them as educational programs, thus requiring the teaching of Qur’an.193 The 
Baptists renamed the services salat al’atfal (Children’s Prayer) and continued 
operations.194 Overall the public response to the Baptist mission was ambivalent, but the 
value of their medicine still outweighed their disruption. 
Despite the evangelical practices of the FMB, the Egyptian Administration and 
UNRWA pushed FMB medical missionaries to treat a larger number of Palestinian 
refugees. In 1958, the hospital reported that its 92-beds were almost constantly filled. 
Additional patients laid in stretchers throughout the hospital halls and many patients, 
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regardless of their condition, were turned away due to lack of beds, nurses, or operating 
schedules.195 Nonetheless, in 1959 the Administration and Agency assigned the hospital 
more work in gynecological and obstetric care, against the wishes of the hospital.196 They 
also required the hospital to treat surgical and complicated obstetrical cases from Gaza City 
and the mu’askerat of Jabaliya, al-Shati, Khan Younes, and Rafah.197 The hospital steadily 
treated an increasing number of refugee patients. Between 1961 and 1963 outpatients grew 
from 12,056 to 31,694; total operations from 3,415 to 5,227; and infant deliveries from 275 
to 609.198 Most of the time the hospital operated with one or two surgeons meaning each 
surgeon performed an average of seven operations a day in 1963.199 In fact, most surgeons 
who worked at the hospital took a year furlough after a year of service. The demands of 
treating Palestinian refugees certainly did not leave much time to care for their long-term 
health.  
Treating Palestinian refugees continued to operate like a statistical game between 
the Egyptian Administration and UNRWA. Egyptian publications censured the efforts of 
the UNRWA, promising to rid refugees of their dependency on UN aid.200 In 1961, the 
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Administration stunned the Agency when it announced that starting 1 February 1962 it 
would care for all refugee patients. The government faced opposition from the refugees, 
reported the missionaries, and the matter was dropped.201 However, a couple months later 
the Administration announced that after 1 April 1962 all refugee patients would receive 
Egyptian care. Again, the claim was dropped.202  During this period the medical 
missionaries felt pressure to perform statistically, meeting the expectations of the 
authorities in Gaza. In 1962 statistics for the hospital seemingly doubled when outpatients 
increased from 12,056 to more than 25,000.203 Previously the medical missionaries had not 
counted revisits but felt pressured to include this number in the total, thus artificially 
inflating their production.204 Yet again recording statistics of medical treatment 
outweighed concerns for practices which prioritized long-term care and solutions. 
Despite the pressure to maintain everyday operations at the hospital, the FMB 
sustained its evangelical practices. The missionaries handed gospel tracts to all patients and 
their families and encouraged ambulatory patients to attend church services.205 To improve 
the effectiveness of these services, the FMB appointed Hana Ibrahim, an Egyptian pastor 
from Beni Suef, to head the Gazan congregation. Upon assuming his role as the lead pastor 
of the Gaza Baptist Church, Ibrahim recorded a congregation of 70 to 80 members for each 
Sunday gathering.206 He also noted Egyptian officials who attended the Baptist church for 
 
201 James B. Young, 1962 Gaza Station Report (Gaza: Arab Baptist Mission, 1962), 2, IMB. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Nicholas, 1965 Gaza Mission Report and Budget, 2. 
205 Ibid. 
206 This information comes from Samy Ibrahim’s book about his parents’ journey in Egypt and Gaza. This 
section entitled “ikhtibār al-qis Hana Ibrahim” (The Experience of Pastor Hanna Ibrahim) was written by 
 63 
significant events and holiday celebrations, support he interpreted as solidarity with the 
Baptist medical mission in Gaza.207 Ibrahim faced some opposition from the people of 
Gaza but was comforted by his relationship with Egyptian officials. 
 
  
Illustration 2:   Gaza Baptist Church in 1958.208 
 
With tacit support from the Egyptian Administration, the missionaries made a 
serious commitment towards developing the evangelical potential of the nursing school 
during the 1960s. First, they acquired an acre of land from the Armenian Patriarchate to 
 
Hana Ibrahim and edited/recorded by Samy Ibrahim.  Samy Ibrahim and Hana Ibrahim, Fi khidma al-fādī, 
al-Ṭabʻah 1. (Boston; madinat naṣir, miṣr: Eagles Publications; maṭābʿ alūks, 2019), 111. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Cornell Goerner, 1958, Dargan Library, LifeWay Christian Resources, Nashville, TN 
 64 
build a residence for nursing students.209 The Baptist nursing school remained the only 
nursing school in Gaza, a three-year program that attracted students from Lebanon, Jordan, 
Egypt, and Gaza. The school rarely lacked male applicants, but the missionaries desired 
more female applicants, especially from Gaza.210 Despite a relative degree of success, the 
missionaries struggled to grow their nursing program as the Baptist nursing degree was 
initially only recognized in Gaza. The missionaries were surprised in 1964 when the 
Egyptian Minister of Nursing Education visited the school and granted it official 
recognition in Egypt.211 Recognition  for the program, which emerged from Egypt’s 
strategy during the 1960s to provide relief, employment, and education opportunities to 
Palestinians in Gaza, allowed graduates of the program to work outside of Gaza more 
easily.212 At the same time the missionaries enjoyed evangelical success with their nursing 
program. Between 1964 and 1967 over thirty of the student-nurses made professions of 
faith and were baptized in the church.213 Although the Baptist missionaries recorded 
professions of faith from Muslims in Gaza, they did not record their baptisms. During the 
1960s the Baptist missionaries seemed less disturbed by the Egyptian Administration but 
baptizing Muslims would certainly sow discord. The social consequences of baptism were 
 
209 Arab Baptist Mission, 1963-1964 Gaza Station Report, 1. 
210 Most female applicants were from Lebanon and Egypt. Nicholas, Crawford, and Lovegren, 1959 Gaza 
Station Report, 37. 
211 Arab Baptist Mission, Executive Committee Meeting Beirut Nov. 18-19, 1964 (Beirut: Arab Baptist 
Mission, 1964), 1, IMB. 
212 The UAR identified relief, employment, and education as three sequential goals for the future of 
refugees and citizens of Gaza. United Arab Republic., Qiṭāʻ Ghazzah. (al-Qāhirah: Maṣlaḥat al-Istiʻlāmāt, 
1966), 29–32. 
213 David Dorr and Ed Nicholas, 1965 Gaza Report (Arab Baptist Mission, 1965), 21, IMB; Marylin 
Sheaffer-Farag, Report of the Baptist School of Nursing-School Year 1966-67 (Gaza: Gaza Baptist 
Hospital, n.d.), IMB; Nicholas, 1965 Gaza Mission Report and Budget. 
 65 
dire for Muslims who even after sincere acceptance of the Baptist message, opted to avoid 
outward expressions of faith. 
Just as the FMB missionaries felt confident in the permanence of their mission, 
relatively undisturbed by the Egyptian Administration, Gazan landowners challenged their 
practices. When the FMB purchased the hospital from the CMS, they became aware of the 
legal complications of land ownership in Gaza. Two-thirds of the hospital grounds were 
deemed waqf property and divided amongst many owners. The hospital lawyer, Farra 
Sarraf, recommended the missionaries settle the land disputes with each landowner. 
Unsatisfied with the legal advice, the missionaries consulted a local qadi (judge) who 
advised them to develop the land, solidifying their claim. Legal documents from the 
Ottoman era remained undiscovered, so local courts deliberated over the rightful owners 
of the land until 1965 when they ruled in favor of the Palestinians.214 The courts confirmed 
that two-thirds of the hospital land were waqf property, and due to the abolition of waqf 
dhurri in 1954, the courts divided the hospital property amongst many inheritors.215 
Following the decision, Dr. Dorr received a letter from Abdul Razzak El-Alami, one of the 
inheritors, who requested payment for his family’s share of the property.216 In fact, the 
missionaries received several requests for payment from the inheritors of the property but 
decided to ignore them as the owners were divided and powerless to enforce the legal 
verdict.  
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The land dispute did not disappear after the court decision. One of the most 
prominent landowners, Ghazi Shawa, purchased waqf land from other shareholders.217 By 
1966, he owned approximately one-third of the total, substantially more than the next 
largest shareholder.218 Shawa was among a small number of Palestinians who valued the 
land of Gaza and had the financial means to acquire it. For them, dignity for the land was 
tantamount to the dignity of the people. Landownership gave Shawa and other propertied 
individuals an authentic claim to legitimacy in Gaza, but they remained powerless without 
support from the Administration.219   
More concerned with regional rather than local approval, the Administration 
continued to ignore the interests of local landowners in Gaza. Nasser, who remained 
preoccupied with claiming sole authority of Gaza, decided to evict the UNEF in early 1967. 
Historian Nathan Shachar claims that the decision was motivated by a lack of respect in 
the Arab world, as rivals taunted Nasser for “taking shelter behind the UN[…]emasculating 
the Palestinian resistance[…and] guaranteeing Israel’s security.”220 Removing the UNEF 
from Gaza allowed Nasser to claim sole authority in Gaza, legitimated by his support for 
Palestinian education, medicine, and resistance. Egyptian authority in Gaza, nonetheless, 
proved brief. At 12:35 P.M. on 6 June 1967 Gaza fell to Israel on the second day of the 
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1967 Arab-Israeli War, putting all existing authority into question. The second Israeli 
occupation of Gaza proved the end of the Egyptian Administration in the strip. 
The UNRWA also recognized the 1967 War as a significant challenge to their 
medical practices in Gaza. The Agency evacuated most of its personnel in late May, but 
some FMB missionaries, like Dr. Dorr and Dr. Merrill Moore, remained in Gaza. During 
the conflict, the missionaries used the church as an overflow area with hospital beds lining 
the sanctuary.221 Pastor Ibrahim, who continued to lead the Gazan congregation during the 
war, recorded over 500 Palestinians who sought refuge in the church to avoid Israeli 
bombs.222 L.W. Whymark, a UNRWA officer, also observed the status of the Baptist 
hospital and church during the war:  
The hospital had been the centre of intensive mortar and shell fire from Israeli 
forces who were endeavoring to knock out UAR guns in the vicinity. Four shells 
or mortars landed and exploded in the Hospital Compound, injuring one member 
of the hospital staff, but caused no damage to Hospital buildings: numerous other 
shells and mortars had exploded in the vicinity of the Hospital, but the Hospital 
continued to function[…]The Baptist Hospital was full to overflowing. Casualties 
had started arriving during the evening of 5 June and the flow continued during 
subsequent days. The main hospital in Gaza, the Shifa Hospital was placed under 
heavy security after the Israeli Army captured Gaza, as a number of UAR and 
PLA officers sought to evade arrest by taking refuge there. This meant of course 
that the burden of work on the Baptist Hospital increased enormously and was 
dealt with by Dr. Dorr and his staff.223 
 
Whymark concluded his letter by making his intentions clear. He did not enter the hospital 
wards following the conflict because he did not want to see the “misery and suffering of 
the patients,” but he wished to make the “dedication and courage” of Dr. Dorr and his staff 
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known.224 The number of operations during the 1967 War went unrecorded but the service 
of the medical missionaries was not easily forgotten in Gaza.225 
 When the war ended, the status of the hospital resembled Gaza in many ways. First, 
there was significant material damage to overcome. Dr. Dorr noted damage to the hospital 
complex including broken windows and several collapsed walls. The destruction required 
“repairing, remodeling, and the purchasing of movable equipment, rather than major 
construction.”226 The missionaries opted for temporary repairs rather than permeant 
fixtures due to the uncertain future of the hospital. Second, the future of evangelism in 
Gaza was in jeopardy. Many Sunday services closed as UN attendees and the families of 
Arab Christians departed Gaza. Church membership shrunk to thirty-five including 
missionaries.227 The female nursing staff decreased from twenty-four to seven, thirteen of 
whom were repatriated to Egypt and Lebanon, which led to the closure of the obstetric 
section and women’s ward.228 Lastly, the Baptist missionaries, like many Palestinians in 
Gaza, were resolute despite uncertainty. Pastor Ibrahim construed the war as a crucible for 
the gospel message, describing the emergence of a spiritual nahda (renaissance) from 
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overwhelming fear.229 Dr. Dorr looked forward to the post-war era, hoping for “greater 
liberty to proclaim the gospel.”230 In a far-greater manner, Palestinians in Gaza longed for 
dignity following many years of undue suffering. For them, the 1967 war also proved a 
crucible of authentic resistance against colonial subjugation.   
*** 
From 1948 to 1967, the narrative of the FMB mission hospital dynamically 
intersected with local, regional, and international authorities in Gaza. Its role as a site of 
ambivalence, an institution committed to medicine and proselytism, necessitated a 
response from local landowners, the Egyptian Administration, and the UNRWA. Their 
responses revealed contradictory commitments, evidencing their struggle for authority in 
Gaza. The responsibility for offering medical treatments to Palestinian refugees, though 
not the only legitimating practice, granted tangible, albeit divisive authority. Ignored in the 
battle for medical responsibility were the claims of Gazan landowners, who despite an 
intimate connection to the land and its people were restrained in determining its future. 
Palestinian refugees, meanwhile, became an object in the struggle for authority—counted, 
ruled, proselytized, treated, mistreated, and ignored.  
 For the sake of Gaza and beyond, the FMB mission hospital plays a multifarious 
role in understanding the historic process of decolonization.  After the collapse of the 
British Mandate in Palestine, as was the case in all former colonies, new governments 
required legitimating practices to authorize their rule. Ilana Feldman identifies bureaucratic 
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continuity as a practice that legitimated authority in Gaza; this chapter adds the centrality 
of medical treatments and property ownership.  While these practices, among others, 
legitimated the authority of postcolonial governments, the Gazan, and more broadly 
Palestinian experience, is more specific. The source material of the mission hospital brings 
attention to the role of local Gazans, landowners and refugees, who were restricted from 
full participation in these legitimating practices. This chapter, following Ussama Makdisi 
and Beth Baron, makes legible these restrictions on Gazan society through the lens of the 
Gaza Baptist Hospital. Rather than evaluate the hospital itself, for its services as a medical 
institution or its proselytism as mission venture, this chapter analyzes responses to the 
hospital, attesting to the disenfranchisement of the Palestinians and manifold trajectories 




Hours prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Baptist missionaries at the Gaza Baptist 
Hospital celebrated the wedding of Nasser Farag, an Egyptian working for the FMB, and 
Marilyn Shaffer, an American missionary.231 War loomed over the hospital and its staff, 
potentially jeopardizing its continued operations. They nevertheless took comfort in the 
wedding celebration, which for them evidenced the successful assimilation of their 
American mission into Gazan society.  
In many ways, the wedding also represented authority in Gaza before 1967. The 
Egyptian Administration, in partnership with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), governed Gaza by meeting its educational and medical needs. Practices of 
medicine, in particular, legitimated the authority of these foreign entities in Gaza which 
faced little resistance outside of local Gazan officials. The Gazan waqf (religious 
endowment) administrators were among the local officials who challenged and shaped the 
directives of the Administration and Agency. These entities converged at numerous 
intersections, including the Gaza Baptist Hospital, which received funding from the 
Agency, tacit support from the Administration, and legal challenge from the Gazan waqf 
administration.  
Baptist missionaries in Gaza carefully navigated this intersection, a location I 
describe as a “site of ambivalence.” In other words, the hospital both benefited Gazan 
society with medical practices and disrupted it with proselytizing efforts. These polarizing 
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practices necessitated a response from local and foreign authorities in Gaza. Before 1967 
the Baptist missionaries appeased the Agency and Administration, represented by the 
marriage of Farag, an Egyptian working in Gaza, and Shaffer, a UNRWA supported Baptist 
missionary. However, the hospital faced legal opposition from the Gazan waqf 
administration, which challenged the missionaries’ claim to the hospital property. The 1967 
War put all Gazan law and authority into question. This chapter examines the evolving 
relationship between Gazan law, authority, and medicine following 1967. 
The records of Baptist missionaries at the Gaza Baptist Hospital—concerning 
medicine, property disputes, and evangelism—help unveil the daily experience of Gazans 
in the wake of the 1967 War. In this chapter, through the perspective of the mission 
hospital, I argue that the 1967 War and subsequent Israeli occupation nullified practices of 
landownership in Gaza, leaving a political vacuum in which controlling the Palestinian 
body offered the only means of legitimacy. Pre-established institutions, like the Gazan 
waqf administration, were effectively marginalized by the Israeli military occupation. The 
practice of landownership, a traditional source of legitimacy and authority, became 
untenable in Gaza. Relatively novel organizations, such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and Muslim Brotherhood, claimed authority in Gaza by utilizing the 
Palestinian body as a focal point of resistance. The Israeli military administration and 
UNRWA also competed with these local entities for control over the body via medical 
practices as legal practices became arbitrary and ineffective. The Gaza Baptist Hospital 




Before 1967, developments in the privatization and nationalization of awqāf 
(religious endowments; plural of waqf) threatened the continued operations of the Gaza 
Baptist Hospital. In the early twentieth century, awqāf ahlīa (family endowments; singular 
waqf ahlī), known as waqf dhurrī in Gaza, posed an issue for both individuals and the state. 
An individual could endow waqf ahlī for the benefit of his or her progeny, setting 
preconditions for the duration and nature of the endowment.232 The beneficiaries of waqf 
ahlī did not own the endowed property but received its benefits, often in the form of 
financial compensation. 233 However, due to the lack of private ownership, and the 
numerous beneficiaries tied to a single endowment, these properties were often 
mismanaged. In Egypt, for example, waqf ahlī “became a means to avoid the law of 
inheritance, or the land tax,” 234 which meant that the Egyptian state lost considerable 
taxable land. Individual beneficiaries of waqf ahlī, similar to the Egyptian state, had little 
control over waqf ahlī and began to call for its abolition.235 In 1923, Egyptian law shortened 
the disposition period of waqf ahlī, allowing an endowment beneficiary to become a full 
possessor in five years rather than the previous thirty-three.236  In 1946, Egyptian law 
banned the creation of new awqāf ahlīa and then, in 1952, it abolished awqāf ahlīa allowing 
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for its privatization.237  Under the new abolition, the beneficiaries of waqf ahlī became 
private owners of the endowment. Upon death, however, the waqf owners could only 
endow one-third of their property holdings to their progeny. The newly created Ministry of 
Awqaf, working on behalf of the Egyptian government, acquired the remaining two-thirds 
of the property.238 The privatization and nationalization of awqāf directly impacted the 
property of the Gaza Baptist Hospital. In 1954, the Egyptian Administration extended the 
abolition of waqf ahlī in Egypt to abolish waqf dhurrī in Gaza. The abolition meant that 
the property of the Gaza Baptist Hospital, over which Gazan courts deliberated whether it 
belonged to the hospital or an endowment, could fall under the private ownership of Gazans 
or, eventually, the national ownership of the Egyptian Administration. The Baptist 
missionaries feared that the privatization or nationalization of the hospital property could 
jeopardize their claims to the hospital.  
In 1965, after deliberating for over a decade, Gazan courts decided that two-thirds 
of the land presently used by the hospital were endowed property belonging to waqf 
beneficiaries.239 Due to the abolition of waqf dhurrī, the beneficiaries of the hospital 
property became its private owners. The missionaries received letters from several property 
owners who requested payment for their shares.240 One of the most prominent owners of 
hospital property, Ghazi Shawa, purchased shares from the other beneficiaries and owned 
one-third of the total by 1966.241 Shawa was a member of a prominent family, which held 
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political and economic standing in Gaza city. The Shawa family competed for authority 
and the right to govern Gaza with foreign entities like the Egyptian Administration, which 
saw the abolition of waqf dhurrī as a measure to reform land use and assume greater control 
over it. The practice of landownership directly corresponded to legitimacy and authority in 
Gaza. The abolition of waqf dhurrī, however, proved precarious for the new landowners in 
Gaza, like Shawa, who often owned minuscule portions. At the Gaza Baptist Hospital this 
same phenomenon occurred as a multitude of waqf inheritors possessed tiny allotments of 
hospital property. Owning miniscule, unsubstantial pieces of property, paired with the 
desperate political and economic situation in Gaza, pushed many owners to sell shares 
without authorization from the court.242 The Baptist missionaries feared that if waqf shares 
were consolidated under a single owner, their claim to the hospital would become 
precarious.  
 The Baptist missionaries consulted a Gazan lawyer, Faraj Sarraf, and a local qadi 
(judge) for legal counsel. Sarraf recommended they settle with the waqf inheritors by 
purchasing shares and selling valuable land previously acquired by the hospital complex.243 
In particular, the Baptist missionaries owned a tennis court along a busy thoroughfare that 
many of the inheritors desired in order to develop storefronts. But the Baptist missionaries, 
unsatisfied with the Sarraf’s legal advice, decided to consult a local qadi who advised them 
to develop the hospital land and solidify their claim to it.244 The Baptist missionaries 
 
242 Dumper, “Forty Years without Slumbering.” 
243 Franklin Fowler, Gaza Baptist Hospital Visit to Gaza, April 6-12, 1967 (Gaza, April 17, 1967), 4, 
International Mission Board Archives. 
244 Dorr and Nicholas, 1965 Gaza Report, 2. 
 76 
preferred the more cost-efficient advice of the qadi and decided to expand hospital services 
while ignoring the waqf inheritors. They opted for the principle of possession, which 
carried into the post-1967 era. 
 Abruptly, the outbreak of war in 1967 put all existing authority in Gaza into 
question. The Baptist hospital administrator, Dr. David Dorr, recorded the experience 
laconically, “The hospital has always worked under an Arab government. After the war of 
June 5, we now find ourselves in Israeli territory.”245 A later account of the event provides 
more detail regarding the suddenness of the invasion and its impact on the hospital:  
Suddenly an Israeli army unit appeared at the main gate. An officer came into the 
hospital to announce that (1.) the Israeli army was now in charge of the city, and 
(2.) any need of the hospital should be directed to him. The doctors told him of the 
critical need for water. To everyone’s amazement, shortly thereafter, an Israeli 
water truck drove in to fill up the cistern.246 
 
 
The Israeli invasion came with many questions in terms of the nature and duration of the 
subsequent occupation. The Baptist hospital decided to press forward in service to the 
Gazan community and towards its evangelical mission.  
 The Israeli military largely filled the role vacated by the Egyptian Administration, 
leading the FMB to believe that the principle of possession would continue to hold sway 
under the new political order. As its first action in Gaza, the Israeli government appointed 
a military Governor to replace the position held by the Egyptian Governor-General.247 
Prominent families in Gaza, like the Shawa family, who could have claimed their right to 
 
245 Dorr, 1967 Gaza Hospital Report, 1. 
246 International Mission Board, The Witness in Gaza, 13–14. 
247 Dumper, “Forty Years without Slumbering,” 182. 
 77 
govern based on practices of landownership and significant involvement in political and 
economic issues, failed to form a united front against the Israeli occupation. Without 
unification, legal and administrative entities, like the Gazan waqf administration, were 
“obliged to accept a delicate modus vivendi with the Israeli military government.” 248 
Administrations in Gaza, like the waqf administration, had previously relied on the 
Egyptian Administration for financial support due to the loss of significant revenue earning 
property in 1948. The early Israeli administration in Gaza acted in a similar manner to the 
Egyptian Administration, leading the Gaza Baptist Hospital to pursue a similar principle 
of possession in laying claim to the hospital property. Furthermore, hospital leaders 
questioned the permanency of the Israeli occupation in Gaza, based on the temporary 
occupation in 1956, believing that the Egyptian Administration may be restored following 
a brief period. Due to the present considerations, the hospital continued to develop its 





Illustration 3:   Gaza Baptist Hospital (undated).249 
 
 The occupation dragged into months and then years, during which the Baptist 
missionaries continued to develop the hospital complex to solidify their claims to the 
property. The missionaries began by renovating existing structures. They built a second 
floor on a building for out-patients, which included office space for two doctors and three 
rooms for a new laboratory program.250 The laboratory program included on-site 
equipment for “hematology, urinalysis, and stool specimen” analysis.251  The three rooms 
were dedicated for several purposes: “One room [was] used for bacteriology, weighing 
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reagents, and [the] cleaning, drying and sterilizing of glassware. The second room [was] 
used exclusively for chemistry. The third room [was] a combination blood bank and blood 
donor room.”252 The program provided these services and trained local students, certifying 
them to work as laboratory technicians.253 Into the late 1960s, the hospital complex 
continued to expand its services by founding the “first physical therapy unit in the Gaza 
Strip” and renaming the nursing school, which “became known as the Baptist School of 
Allied Health Sciences” to encompass their new programs.254 Faced with a precarious 
political situation, the missionaries opted to strengthen their claim to the hospital property 
in anticipation of future legal battles over its true ownership.  
The Baptist missionaries also expanded their efforts beyond the hospital complex, 
believing a stronger influence in Gazan society corresponded to strengthening their claims 
to the hospital property. The UNRWA noted “enormous difficulties” caused by the 
shortages of textbooks in Gaza.255 The Baptist missionaries responded to this shortage in 
part by opening a lending library in 1969 under what one source called a “euphonious 
name,” The Center of Culture and Light [possibly markaz al-thaqāfa wa al-nūr in 
Arabic].”256 The missionaries opened the lending library on a busy thoroughfare near the 
present Islamic University of Gaza. Anne Nicholas and Isam Farah founded and headed 
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Christian literature.”257Although the center responded to the textbook shortage in Gaza, 
they sought to meet this need with an evangelical agenda. The missionaries explained that:  
At first, many of the Muslims were afraid we would try to convert them or their 
children, using the library as a front the way Communists do. We have assured them 
the library is for everyone and no one will be forced in any way to read or to study 
anything they do not choose themselves.258 
 
Instead, the missionaries wanted to engage Muslims in conversation and through “personal 
connections.” 259 Christian literature, posters, decorations, and tracts were on display 
throughout the library. Despite describing their efforts in different terms than the coercive 
practices of “Communists” in Gaza, the missionaries certainly saw their attempts within 
the bookstore through an evangelical lens. This means of evangelism, the missionaries 
believed, was only possible due to Israeli rule in Gaza.  
Especially in the beginning, the Baptist missionaries viewed the 1967 War and 
subsequent occupation in separate terms than the community in which they operated. When 
the repercussions of 1967 began to set in, the missionaries responded optimistically. They 
believed that: “Some people found their faith challenged severely by the Arab defeat” and 
were more receptive to the gospel message.260 They interpreted the Israeli occupation as a 
boon to their evangelical mission. Anne Nicholas, the founder of the Baptist library, writes: 
“[t]he big source of encouragement for evangelism in Gaza is the increased freedom to 
 
257 Anne Nicholas, 1969 Gaza Hospital Report (Gaza: Gaza Baptist Hospital, October 23, 1969), 
International Mission Board Archives. 
258 James W. Smith, In Their Midst: Interfaith Fellowship in Israel 1955-1989 (Nashville: Fields Pub, 
2015), 177. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Merrill Moore, 1967 Gaza Hospital Report (Gaza: Gaza Baptist Hospital, 1967), 3, International 
Mission Board Archives. 
 81 
witness without fear of governmental restrictions. It seems possible now for the first time 
to begin other centers of ministry and service in this Muslim area.”261 In particular, she 
referred to the Baptist lending library, which the missionaries believed was only possible 
due to Israeli governance. In general, the Baptist missionaries interpreted Israeli rule as an 
opportunity to operate more freely in Gaza with fewer repercussions for open proselytism. 
While Baptist sources recorded the early Israeli occupation of Gaza with hopeful 
anticipation, relishing the potential for unencumbered evangelism, reality differed 
significantly. Following the 1967 War, Israeli political leaders considered a wide range of 
solutions to their concerns regarding Gaza, ranging from incorporation into Israel to mass 
relocation of the Gazan population.262 Regardless of the approach, Israel needed to bring 
Gaza under its suzerainty, which began violently in 1967 and lasted until 1972.263 UNRWA 
staff members recorded how the Israeli military brought Gaza under its control, with a 
“succession of incidents and security measures, such as curfews, interrogations, detentions, 
and, on some occasions, the demolition of houses which followed.”264 Gazans responded 
accordingly as “strikes and incidents of violence were an almost continuous feature of 
life.”265 These descriptions were recorded by UNRWA staff members who also “could not 
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escape some of the consequences such as arrest, detention and imprisonment.”266 For Gaza, 
the period between 1967 and 1972 resembled a continuous state of war in which Israel 
governed the populace through force and military law. 
Tension in Gaza reached a boiling point at the end of the period between 1971 and 
1972, when Ariel Sharon took over the Southern Command of the Israeli Defense Force 
(IDF). This period became known as the “Dirty War” during which Sharon, in close 
communication with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, worked to eradicate the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Gaza.267 Sharon imposed strict curfews, which extended 
to twenty-four hours in some refugee camps.268 Rather than conducting raids to remove 
PLO members and their supporters from these camps, Sharon employed army bulldozers 
to level dwellings suspected of harboring enemies of the Israeli state.269 The bulldozers 
also paved circular roads around refugee camps and grids within them to facilitate Israeli 
military control when navigating these densely populated areas.270 These tactics became 
part of the daily experience for refugees, especially those living in the camps of Shaati, 
Rafah, and Jabaliya. The Israeli military also enacted measures to control Gazan elites and 
residents. In 1971, Sharon put Ragheb al-Alami, the mayor of Gaza, under house arrest for 
refusing to connect to the electricity grid of Israel.271 Baptist missionaries recorded the 
presence of Israeli mista’arvim (derived from the Arabic word musta’ribin, those who live 
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among the Arabs), comprised of Mizrahi Jews, Bedouins, and Druze working undercover 
for the Israeli state. These undercover forces stopped, strip-searched, and interrogated the 
residents of Gaza City.272 The “Dirty War” effectively brought Gaza under greater Israeli 
influence at the expense of Gazan dignity, privacy, and lives.  
The totalizing control of the Israeli state over the Gazan populace also extended to 
Gazan law, which directly impacted the Gaza Baptist Hospital. The Israeli military 
preserved the system of law in Gaza but voided its significance.273 Rather than formally 
intervene by changing the Gazan legal system, Israel effectively marginalized the entire 
system by “channeling all the important issues […] to the Israeli military courts.”274 These 
courts operated with laws “inherited from different sources: some from the British, some 
adapted from the Egyptian administration and some military orders created to fill the 
gaps.”275 The Israeli military applied these laws through a rigid application of Emergency 
Regulations in which they began transferring areas of jurisdiction from civil courts, like 
tax assessment and customs, to military courts.276 While finding documentation to describe 
the exact nature of these courts is presently impossible, Gazan lawyers have compared the 
military courts to “a theatre [where] the verdict has been scripted in advance.”277 The Gaza 
Baptist Hospital also experienced these trends in Israeli law through silence in their 
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historical records. Before the early 1970s, legal disputes in Gaza dominated the mission 
records, which saw the waqf administration in Gaza as the greatest challenge to their claims 
to the hospital complex. Suddenly, in the early 1970s, legal disputes disappeared 
completely from the historical record of the hospital, replaced with new concerns unrelated 
to law. This shift corresponds with how the Israeli military courts operated in Gaza, 
prioritizing state interests over those of Gazans and curtailing the enforceability of existing 
Gazan law .  
To understand the impact of Israeli military law on the waqf administration in Gaza, 
it is helpful to compare it to the situation in the West Bank. Following the 1948 War, the 
waqf administrations in Gaza and the West Bank were restricted when they lost 
considerable landholdings. By 1965, Israel had expropriated 93% of Palestinian awqāf 
under the Absentee Property Law.278 The 1967 War brought remaining Palestinian awqāf 
under Israeli suzerainty.279 Although the waqf administrations in Gaza and the West Bank 
survived the occupation, they lost legal backing and the ability to operate effectively. A 
mutawallī (waqf trustee) of a waqf dhurrī in Jerusalem explained the issue: “if you have a 
rent problem with a tenant, and you take legal action against him, the court decision can 
hardly be enforced.”280 The prominence of Israeli military courts in Gaza and the West 
Bank neutralized the power of local courts in enforcing property law verdicts.  
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The fate of the waqf administration in Gaza, however, differed significantly from 
that in the West Bank. Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Jordanian 
government continued to finance and protect its waqf administration. The Egyptian 
Administration did not play the same role in Gaza, leaving the system in a “weak and 
vulnerable position.” 281 Additionally, the Gazan waqf administration was incorporated into 
the Egyptian military prior to the 1967 War. As Michael Dumper explains, “[w]ith the 
office of the ma’mur al-awaqf [Gazan waqf administration] already accountable to the 
Egyptian military government, the way was open for the Israeli military government to 
take the same position.”282 The Gazan waqf administration lost the majority of its income-
producing land in 1948 and relied on the Egyptian government for financial aid until 1967. 
After 1967, the waqf administration needed Israeli support. Although published records are 
presently unavailable, Michael Dumper concludes, based on numerous interviews, that 
although the waqf administration in Gaza enjoyed some degree of autonomy, there has 
been significant Israeli intervention in appointments and salaries.283 Israel financially 
supported the Gazan waqf administration following 1967, influencing its decisions and 
marginalizing the enforceability of property law; however, the exact degree of this control 
is largely unknown.284 
 Due to the marginalization of the Gazan waqf administration, the Baptist 
missionaries ceased to consider it a threat to their operations. From 1967 to 1972, the 
 
281 Dumper, “Forty Years without Slumbering,” 181. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid., 184. 
284 Suleiman, “Conflict over Waqf Property in Jerusalem: Disputed Jurisdictions between Civil and Shari’a 
Courts,” 109. 
 86 
Baptist missionaries worked fervently towards solidifying their claims to the hospital 
property with renovations and new additions. After 1972, the missionaries ceased their 
initiatives corresponding to the property despite. They stopped developing and initiating 
new programs at the hospital complex, they limited outreach beyond the hospital to the 
bookstore, and they took no interest in documenting legal disputes in their records. The 
Israeli government diminished the authority of the waqf administration, as part of their own 
efforts to control Gazan land, which ironically benefited the missionaries in the short 
term.285 Local authorities in Gaza no longer had the ability to reprimand and remove the 
FMB missionaries, resistance organizations in Gaza focused on the Israeli occupation, and 
the missionaries saw new opportunities to work without consequence. Practices of 
landownership, which once threatened hospital operations, lost salience as the Israeli 
military administration penetrated Gazan law.  
The missionaries, working closely with their sending agency, the Foreign Mission 
Board (FMB), began to reconfigure their directives in accordance with Israeli domination. 
The Gaza Baptist Hospital was previously part of the Arab Baptist Mission of the FMB, 
which operated in Gaza, Lebanon, and Jordan.286 In the early 1970s, the FMB reconfigured 
the Arab Baptist Mission by removing the Gaza Baptist Hospital from its jurisdiction, 
placing the hospital within the Baptist Convention of Israel (BCI). FMB missionaries in 
Nazareth, Ashkelon, Jerusalem, and Cana traveled relatively unencumbered between these 
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(re)connected cities.287 Dr. Franklin T. Fowler, a FMB missionary based in Jerusalem, 
writes about the “pleasure of driving” from Tel Aviv to Gaza following the war.288 The 
Baptist missionaries believed there was a legitimate possibility for Gaza to be incorporated 
into Israel.289  
The mobility between Gaza and Israel was not only enjoyed by the Baptist 
missionaries, but part and parcel of Israeli political strategy. Following the “Dirty War," 
Defense Minister Dayan reversed Israeli strategy and initiated an open-door policy to 
integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the Israeli economy.290 He desired to defuse the 
political situation by opening the newly occupied areas to the now larger Israeli state. The 
Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs was among the first Israeli institutions to take 
advantage of this policy. The ministry encouraged interchange between Islamic seminaries 
in the West Bank, Gaza, and within Israel itself.291 This policy also had implications for 
the students within the Baptist medical schools. Dr. Merrill Moore, a surgeon in the Baptist 
hospital, records: “[s]ome of our graduates have now begun to inquire about registration in 
Israel. Because of this we will be doing everything necessary to meet Israeli registration 
requirements so our graduates can take the Israeli Board Examinations if they choose.”292 
 
287 Moore, 1967 Gaza Hospital Report, 2–3. 
288 Franklin Fowler, “Letter to Dr. Hughey 3 May 1968,” May 3, 1968, 1, International Mission Board 
Archives. 
289 Ibid., 3. 
290 Sara Roy, “The Gaza Strip: Critical Effects of the Occupation,” Arab Studies Quarterly 10, no. 1 
(1988): 61; Filiu and King, Gaza, 147. 
291 Alisa Rubin Peled, “‘Shari’a’ under Challenge: The Political History of Islamic Legal Institutions in 
Israel,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 2 (2009): 253. 
292 Merrill Moore et al., 1971 Gaza Mission Report (Gaza: Gaza Mission, November 15, 1971), 2, 
International Mission Board Archives. 
 88 
For many Palestinians in Gaza, entering the Israeli economy was a difficult decision. Those 
who decided to enter Israel for employment opportunities often faced scorn from the PLO, 
which garnered considerable influence in Gaza leading up to 1972.293 Nonetheless, 
working within Israel promised higher salaries and other economic benefits. The Baptist 
missionaries in Gaza took full advantage of these policies and aligned themselves closely 
with Israeli interests.  
 In 1972, however, the dangerous reality of operating in Gaza under Israeli 
occupation became apparent to the Baptist missionaries. On a January evening, Ed 
Nicholas, the pastor of the Gaza Baptist Church, drove the hospital minibus through the 
Jabaliya refugee camp en route to Tel Aviv. He was accompanied by his two teenage 
daughters and Mavis Pate, the Baptist hospital operating room supervisor. Nicholas 
planned to drop his daughters off at their boarding school in Tel Aviv and then retrieve 
oxygen for the hospital with Pate. Before reaching the outskirts of the refugee camp: 
Ed caught sight of something out of the corner of his eye. Two shapes stepped out 
from the orange grove to his left. Suddenly, to his horror, he realized they were 
preparing to fire at the car! He shoved the accelerator to the floor! One volley of 
shots raked the vehicle at head level, the other at seat level. In a split second Mavis 
turned as if to shout at the girls to get down! She was hit in the head, chest, and 
thighs. She fell forward across the seat. Ed also was hit, but he tried to cradle 
Mavis’s head in his arms and guide the car. With a tire shot out, he managed to 
maneuver the car several hundred yards down the road until it ground to a halt.294 
 
 
A group of Israeli soldiers rushed to the scene. They were already on high alert as Ruth 
Dayan, the wife of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, had been shopping in Gaza and left 
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thirty minutes prior to the attack. The soldiers rushed Nicholas, his daughters, and Pate to 
the Beersheba hospital. Minister Dayan and his staff met the missionaries at the hospital 
and helped them get in contact with the regional head of the FMB, Dr. J.D. Hughey.295 
Nicholas required surgery and physical therapy but survived the attack. Pate passed away 
that evening in the hospital. 
 The Baptist missionaries returned to Gaza the next day and buried Pate behind the 
nursing school. They received permission from the mayor of Gaza to bury her on private 
property as the Protestant cemetery had been desecrated.296 Shortly after the funeral, the 
missionaries received a letter from the PLO, taking responsibility for the incident and 
“assuring the hospital that the attack was a mistake and the Baptist Hospital personnel had 
not been their target.”297 The PLO had assumed any car leaving Gaza after dark was Israeli 
due to the curfew, either “military, government employees, or settlers,”298and they had 
wanted to avenge several who were killed in Jabaliya that morning.299 The Baptist 
missionaries operated in Gaza with a different set of requirements than the general public. 
The strict Israeli curfews did not apply to them, but their legal liminality eventually placed 
them within the crosshairs of violence in Gaza.  
 The missionaries, who once operated under the radar in Gaza, between the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, found themselves at the center of the situation. Several months 
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after Pate’s funeral, the missionaries experienced the military governance of Israel 
firsthand. Israeli soldiers broke into the Gaza Baptist Church on Easter Day and unveiled 
a secret room, hidden behind a row of lockers, where the two young men who killed Pate 
were hiding. Unbeknownst to the missionaries, local staff members at the hospital had been 
feeding and providing the young men with hospital blankets, dishes, and silverware.300 
When the Israeli soldiers opened the secret room, the stench of excrement penetrated the 
air as they had been concealed for months. The soldiers shot and killed one of the men 
while capturing and imprisoning the other.301 The Jerusalem Post later identified three 
young men as taking part in the incident: “Fuad Hamid, age 22; Rashid Sidaw, age 19; 
Azalah Ghidian, age 18.”302 The third young man did not fire at the hospital minibus but 
knew the details of the incident and informed Israeli intelligence of the location of his two 
companions.303  
After the incident within the hospital complex, the Baptist missionaries received an 
indication from the Israeli government that it might expropriate the Baptist hospital in an 
effort to develop Israeli medical services in Gaza.304 Missionary correspondence on the 
issue remained vague, so it is difficult to ascertain the seriousness of this expropriation and 
whether it was related to the death of Pate and subsequent harboring of PLO guerrillas 
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within the hospital compound.305 This was not the last time the Baptist hospital found itself 
caught between Israeli military rule and Palestinian resistance.  
 Based on their records, however, Israeli military rule did not distress the Baptist 
missionaries who instead grew increasingly concerned with the economic situation in 
Gaza. The 1973 War had a limited impact on the Baptist missionaries and their hospital,306 
but subsequent inflation due to the conflict made operations more difficult to nearly 
impossible. Prices dramatically increased after the war, forcing the hospital “to increase 
employee salaries by 133%.”307 Dr. Moore wrote, “The war has meant an increase of 20% 
or more in the cost of living, 40% increase each in gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and 
electricity.”308 The UNRWA reported that massive inflation affected both “refugees and 
Agency finances. The Israeli pound was devalued by 43 percent in November 1974 and 
again by 2 percent in June 1975 and the possibility of further monthly 2 percent 
devaluations was indicated by the Government of Israel.”309 In response to continued 
inflation, Israeli authorities began to charge refugees fees at government hospitals in 1976:  
The fees which will mainly concern the refugees are a hospital charge of £1.20 per 
day and a medical consultation fee of £13. This innovation deprived the refugees 
of free services previously enjoyed at in- and out-patient government services in 
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This new policy enabled the Israeli government to address some economic concerns with 
medical fees, but it also helped initiate the process of documenting and gaining greater 
control over refugees in Gaza. The UNRWA responded to the Israeli government by 
introducing “a refund scheme” on 1 July 1977 to alleviate the economic detriments of 
Israeli policy upon refugees.311 However, these initiatives and rising costs required the 
UNRWA to make budget cuts elsewhere.  
In 1976, the UNRWA began cutting funds to the Gaza Baptist Hospital due to 
financial considerations and underlining concerns with its proselytizing practices. The 
Agency first ceased support for the Baptist nursing school, laboratory, and x-ray rooms,312 
which required the Baptists to suspend the nursing program in Fall 1976.313 The UNRWA 
also limited financial support for refugee patients, forcing the Baptist hospital “to provide 
over $100,000 charity toward UNRWA patients” in 1976 and approximately $115,000 in 
1977.314 The budget constraints forced the hospital to trim down the staff to essential 
members. By 1977, the hospital employed only three physicians (one missionary, two 
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national) and twenty-eight nurses (six missionary, twenty-two national) who served 1,800 
in-patients and 30,000 out-patients.315 Official correspondence remained optimistic, but 
Dr. Thomas Adkins, the new hospital administrator, seemed less assured in a personal letter 
to Dr. Hughey:  
I believe we are fooling ourselves in thinking we can fulfill the medical obligation 
that is here at our door, with less and less personnel. And certainly, the witness is 
not enhanced with more and more “busyness” in the medical load. Something has 
got to change. I don’t have the answers. Normally I am optimistic about the future, 
because ‘where there is a will, there is a way,’ but perhaps His Will is not clearly 
interpreted here, and we need help to understand it.316 
 
 
The health care services that the Baptist missionaries initiated to solidify their claims to the 
hospital property and expand the surface area of their evangelism, like the nursing school, 
laboratory program, and lending library, ironically led to their financial ruin when the 
UNRWA retracted support. The financial support of the UNRWA, which allowed for the 
FMB to cover the majority of refugee medical care, allowed the FMB to direct its own 
financing towards additional programs. When the UNRWA retracted supported, the FMB 
needed to redirect its own financing to the hospital, first and foremost. While the mission 
organization attempted to maintain its ministries outside of the hospital, which it believed 
necessary to maintain its influence in Gaza and ensure future claims to the hospital 
property, the financial situation proved overbearing.  
 Official correspondence between the FMB, its missionaries, and the UNRWA 
maintains that the decision to cut hospital funding was strictly motivated by financial and 
 
315 Ibid. 
316 Thomas Adkins, “Letter to J.D. Hughey,” February 8, 1977, 3, International Mission Board Archives. 
 94 
logistical concerns. However, reading between the lines suggests that the UNRWA also 
cut funding due to the bold evangelical efforts of the missionaries within occupied Gaza. 
In Summer 1977, Dr. Lloyd Callow of the UNRWA requested that “the Baptist Hospital’s 
scope of functions, standards of staffing, and costs be reduced.”317 In responses to the 
“scope of functions and standard of staffing,” Dr. Adkins defended his methods for patient 
care writing: 
It is a personal, and a corporate, conviction here at Baptist Hospital, that the patient 
is a person of worth and should be treated as such […] Our personal integrity and 




Dr. Callow responded to the convictions of Dr. Adkins and the Baptist hospital by cutting 
all UNRWA funding in 1978.319 Although proselytism was never addressed directly, by 
neither the missionaries nor UNRWA, Dr. Adkins maintained that “[t]he problem is 
financial. But it involves the Christian witness directly.”320 The UNRWA wished to 
continue its medical authority in Gaza, which began during the Egyptian Administration 
(1948-1967). The Israeli attempts to dictate medical care in Gaza challenged the authority 
of the UNRWA; the evangelical efforts of the UNRWA supported Baptist hospital also 
chipped away at its legitimacy. By 1978, the UNRWA addressed these concerns in part, 
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removing its affiliation with the Baptist hospital and continuing to offer refugees free 
medical care despite increasing Israeli control over the Gazan medical infrastructure. 
The Baptist hospital shifted its model following the UNRWA funding cut, only 
serving private patients as a general surgical institution. In 1978, hospital beds remained 
the same at 75, but in-patients diminished from 1,800 to 986 and out-patients from 30,000 
to 19,549.321 Out-patients decreased again from 19,549 to 8,559 in 1979.322 The hospital 
operated at about half its previous capacity, and its medical significance likewise 
diminished in Gaza. Once the largest medical institution in the Gaza Strip, serving patients 
from Gaza City and the refugee camps of Shaati, Rafah, and Jabaliya—the Baptist hospital 
now became a small private institution with exorbitant prices. The price of medical care 
turned most Gazans away from treatment at the Baptist hospital, especially refugees who 
could obtain much more affordable care at government and UNRWA medical facilities. 
According to the Baptist missionaries, the UNRWA and economic inflation proved a “pair 
of monsters” that “were to eventually devour the hospital.” 323 
As a private hospital, the Baptist missionaries recognized that they could not sustain 
operations. After weighing all scenarios, including downsizing the staff324 and diversifying 
medical care,325 the FMB decided it impossible to maintain control over the institution.326 
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By the late 1970s, there appeared three possibilities: 1) returning the hospital to the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS), the British mission organization from whom the FMB 
originally purchased the hospital; 2) expropriation into the Israeli medical infrastructure; 
or 3) forcibly losing the hospital to the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. In 1978, Bishop Faik 
Haddad of the Episcopal Diocese of Jerusalem first expressed interest in operating the Gaza 
Baptist Hospital.327 He reminded Dr. Adkins that the FMB purchased the hospital from the 
CMS (part of the same Anglican Communion as the Jerusalem Diocese) with an agreement 
to pay the CMS $100,000 after clearing a title to the hospital property. Because the FMB 
was unable to clear a title after twenty-five years and had never paid the CMS for the 
property, Bishop Haddad, with support from the CMS, recommended the FMB issue him 
the “Power of Attorney” for the hospital property in Gaza.328 Foremost, the Baptist 
missionaries desired to maintain hospital operations, but returning the hospital to the 
Anglican Church, thus maintaining its Christian identity, became a preferable alternative.   
Other potential outcomes appeared less desirable to the Baptist missionaries. In the 
late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza sought control over the Gazan medical 
infrastructure. In 1979, the Brotherhood attempted to overtake the Palestine Red Crescent 
Society (PRCS) in Gaza, removing Dr. Haīdar ‘Abd al-Shāfī from his leadership 
position.329 The Brotherhood was initially unsuccessful in overtaking the PRCS but 
maintained its resolve to gain greater control over Gazan medicine. The Baptist 
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missionaries were concerned that the Brotherhood would later attempt to control their 
hospital.330 Alternatively, the Israeli military government posed a threat to the continuation 
of the hospital. Since 1972, Israeli officials in Gaza had intimated the possibility of 
expropriating the hospital, but their actions became more serious in 1980: 
In February a Palestinian activist hiding behind the hospital wall, hurled two hand 
grenades that exploded on the other side, killing an Israeli officer, his companion, 
and an Arab bystander. Several people were injured and cared for in the hospital. 
That evening an officer of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) appeared at the hospital 
with a jeep-load of soldiers and military police. He announced that in accordance 
with standard policy, they must destroy any structure used by terrorists. The 
bulldozers would be coming the next day to tear down the hospital wall. 331  
 
 
An unnamed physician at the Baptist hospital contacted the United States Embassy in Israel 
for assistance, to which the embassy responded that he needed to settle the issue with the 
local police—the IDF. The physician decided to contact the media and lay in front of the 
hospital when the bulldozers arrived, but “[f]or various reasons, best known to themselves, 
the IDF never carried out the planned destruction much to the relief of the doctor whose 
courage remained untested.”332 Needless to say, by the late 1970s the Baptist hospital found 
itself in a dire situation, caught between various suitors seeking a new direction for the 
medical complex.  
The financially vulnerable position of the Baptist hospital, combined with the threat 
of the Israeli military and Muslim Brotherhood, pushed the FMB to return the hospital to 
the CMS, who subsequently turned the institution over to the Jerusalem Diocese. One 
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Baptist missionary described the end of the Baptist mission in colorful terms: “Axed off at 
the knees by UNRWA and emasculated by its ‘friends,’ Baptist Hospital succumbed to 
fatal financial hemorrhage.”333 The term “friends” refers to the local Gazan Christians who, 
in the estimation of the Baptist missionaries, aroused violent hostility in the Gazan 
community against the Baptist hospital, eventually leading to its demise.334 By the time the 
Baptist missionaries sold the hospital, they had a poor reputation in Gaza due to their 
proselytism and declining medical services. The Jerusalem Diocese quickly distanced 
themselves from the Baptist hospital as “the old sign with the name ‘Gaza Baptist 
Hospital,’ was painted over and replaced with the new name, ‘Al Ahli Arab hospital.’”335 
While the Jerusalem Diocese took control of hospital operations, they allowed seventeen 
Baptist missionary personnel to remain at the hospital.336 They also initially permitted the 
Baptists to run the School of Health Sciences, which had “about 60 students at a time in 
the school, a three year professional nurse program, and a two year technician program for 
laboratory, x-ray, and operating room technicians.”337 The diocese strictly curtailed 
evangelism and worked actively to cease baptisms and other missionary church services.338 
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medical care.339 Al Ahli Arab Hospital operates in Gaza to the present day where it is still 
referred to as the Baptist hospital. 
*** 
Following the 1967 War, the Baptist hospital continued to operate at the 
intersection of various authorities. The removal of the Egyptian Administration left a 
political vacuum, leading to a violent competition for authority between the PLO, Muslim 
Brotherhood, and Israeli State. Each of these political entities sought control over medical 
practices in Gaza, which by extension offered control over Palestinian bodies. Like the 
Gazan waqf administration, the Baptist hospital and UNRWA became increasing 
marginalized within this new political calculus that no longer valued practices of 
landownership. Existing processes of Gazan law and legitimacy were overturned and 
transformed by authorities jostling for control. Medical services remained a legitimating 
practice, but they became increasingly synonymous with the Israeli medical infrastructure. 
Israeli military law, likewise, trivialized landownership and existing property laws. The 
diminishing authority of landownership correlated with the growing significance of the 
body as a site of resistance. Through medical care, the Israeli state desired to control the 
Palestinian body, which remained outside of its purview.  
The records and correspondence of the Gaza Baptist Hospital provide unique 
insight into Gazan law and authority after 1967. Rather than utilize its records for the sake 
of its own history, this chapter has offered an original solution to answer the call of Beshara 
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Doumani while addressing present restrictions on Gazan court records.340 The Baptist 
hospital provides an imprecise lens for examining law and authority in Gaza, building from 
the foundation of Ussama Makdisi, Beth Baron, Heather Sharkey, and Jeffery Culang by 
utilizing missionary sources for the sake of local history.341 The Baptist hospital’s role as 
“site of ambivalence,” with its commitments to medicine and proselytism, required a 
measured response from authorities in Gaza. Unlike the era of the Egyptian Administration, 
the evangelical disruptions of the missionaries under the Israeli occupation finally 
outweighed the benefit of their medical services. The missionaries’ social capital earned 
from the “power of provisioning,” to borrow from Melanie Tanielian’s useful concept, no 
longer justified evangelical intrusion.342 The Baptist hospital leaves a complicated legacy 
in Gaza, but one that allows for careful analysis into the legitimating practices that defined 
developments in Gazan law, authority, and medicine following the 1967 War.  
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Conclusion 
Despite selling the Gaza Baptist Hospital, the FMB maintained a presence in Gaza 
and directly supported the new Al Ahli Arab Hospital until the First Intifada in 1987. 
During this period, the hospital witnessed the continued struggle for political, legal, and 
medical authority in Gaza. In 1983, FMB missionaries recorded the efforts of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in removing Christian medical practices. The Brotherhood, according to the 
FMB, initiated a nursing student strike in which the students repetitively chanted “Down 
with Christians! We Hate you!”343 The nursing school, one of the few institutions the FMB 
continued to administer, was crucial for the continued legitimacy of foreign intervention in 
Gaza. After influencing the nursing school, the Brotherhood attempted to remove 
remaining expatriate physicians by “manufacturing charges against them.”344 When the 
allegations failed to remove the FMB surgeons, members of the Brotherhood stormed the 
hospital and attempted to assassinate the acting hospital director, Dr. Botros Armanious, 
but according to the FMB “the killers did not cut deep enough and botched the job.” 345 Dr. 
Armanious, who worked for the Jerusalem Diocese not the FMB, commended the 
American missionaries for their resilience under the pressure of the Muslim Brotherhood 
who had attempted to bolster their authority in Gaza by controlling medical care. The 
resiliency of Al Ahli Arab Hospital temporarily improved the relations between the FMB 
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remnant and local hospital administration, but the developing situation in Gaza eventually 
proved incompatible with the presence of evangelical missionaries.346 
The Jerusalem Diocese, despite relying on the initial presence and medical 
expertise of the FMB missionaries, desired to forge a new path for Al Ahli Arab Hospital. 
They urged the FMB to cancel chapel services and remove Bible studies from the nursing 
school curriculum, siding with the Palestinian community rather than their Christian 
affiliation with the FMB. The Baptist missionaries felt “their wings clipped” by the 
measures and new directives of the hospital.347 They also experienced what they described 
as a “rise of religious fundamentalism” in Gaza, which resulted in verbal, social, and 
occasional physical attacks on Christians.348 In 1987, Al Ahli Arab Hospital requested 
financial assistance from the FMB who declined to continue their direct support. Hostility 
toward foreign missionaries, restrictions from the Jerusalem Diocese, and the impending 
Intifada, pushed the FMB toward formally abandoning their mission to Gaza. Lacking 
medical services to justify proselytizing efforts, the last Anglo-American evangelical 
mission to Gaza dissipated. 
*** 
 The mission hospital established by the CMS in 1882 evolved under various 
Christian organizations during its first century of existence, witnessing and participating in 
the evolution of Gazan society, medicine, and law. This thesis argued that during this 
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transformational period the mission hospital offered a unique form of modern medicine, 
missionary medicine, which operated somewhere in between a conception of colonial 
medicine and local, Gazan medicine. Missionary medicine in Gaza was neither limited nor 
universal. The missionaries offered medical treatment to every segment of Gazan society, 
but they geared their medical prowess toward members of the society whom they perceived 
as more susceptible to the gospel message. CMS missionaries (1882-1954) categorized 
Gazan society into the dichotomies of wealthy and impoverished, urban and rural, male 
and female, and Muslim and Christian. Based on these dichotomies, the CMS missionaries 
directed their attention toward poor, rural, and female members of Gazan society, while 
offering medical pedagogy exclusively to Christians. A similar calculus of missionary 
medicine existed during the era of the Gaza Baptist Hospital (1954-1981). FMB 
missionaries continued to employ wards to separate patients from their family units. Instead 
of serving patients from rural areas in the periphery of Gaza city, the FMB missionaries 
developed strategies for treating refugee patients who had fled to Gaza following the 
atrocities of al-nakba. Unlike the CMS, the FMB adapted to the refugee crisis and offered 
medical pedagogy to Muslims and Christians, but they designed their pedagogical 
directives with additional interests in mind. The FMB offered a nursing school and lab 
technician training program in which Muslim and Christian students lived within the 
hospital compound. In addition to medical training, the missionaries subjected their 
students to Bible studies and other evangelical events. FMB missionary medicine proved 
more universal than the earlier conceptions of the CMS, but the missionaries touted similar 
proselytizing ends.  
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 After defining the practices and concerns of missionary medicine, this thesis noted 
its controversial place in Gazan society. The imposition of missionary medicine, which 
tore at Gazan social fabric by physically and spiritually separating individuals from the 
family unit, necessitated a hostile response from those governing and residing in Gaza. The 
proselytizing practices of the medical missionaries led to a general degree of distrust in the 
community. Taking advantage of patients during their most vulnerable moments led many 
to repudiate the coercive practices of CMS and FMB missionaries. Some members of 
Gazan society genuinely heard and accepted the evangelical message of the missionaries, 
but still faced social isolation and persecution due to their decision. However, at the same 
time, the beneficial medical practices of the missionaries preserved their evangelical 
imposition, insuring the longevity of their mission. The CMS Hospital offered the first 
modern medical treatments in Gaza, the only modern medical institution between Port Said 
and Jaffa during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The quality and scope of 
operating capabilities brought thousands of patients to the hospital who enjoyed its 
universal benefits. When the FMB took control of the hospital in 1954, its medical 
missionaries offered invaluable services to thousands of refugee patients. The logistical 
demands of refugee medical care in Gaza enabled the FMB to operate with the approval of 
governing entities.  
 Due to the polarizing medical and evangelical practices of the mission hospital 
under the CMS and FMB, this thesis described the hospital as a site of ambivalence. In this 
case, a site of ambivalence referred to a polarizing institution that necessitated a response 
from different segments of society. Gauging social responses with this concept allowed 
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this thesis to move beyond an institutional history of the mission hospital to comment on 
Gazan society, medicine, and law. In the first chapter, the mission hospital testified to the 
composition and evolution of Gazan society. Unlike the rigid categories the missionaries 
used to describe Gazan society, the records of the mission hospital suggested fluidity and 
subtle transformation over time. This transformation disrupted the calculus of CMS 
missionary medicine as Palestinians coalesced under the banner of anti-Zionism.  
After the CMS left Gaza, the FMB continued the practices of missionary medicine 
in a manner that provoked ambivalent responses. In the second chapter, the mission 
hospital found itself a tool in the legitimating processes of various authorities in Gaza. The 
UNRWA and Egyptian Administration condoned the proselytizing efforts of the hospital 
because the statistics of refugee medical care justified their administration and governance. 
Additionally, practices of medicine in Gaza allowed the UN and Egypt to legitimize their 
regional and international authority. In the third chapter, the narrative of the mission 
hospital testified to the local Gazan authorities whose interests were largely ignored by the 
UNRWA, Egyptian Administration, and, after 1967, the State of Israel. Local Gazan 
authorities, like the waqf administration, challenged the proselytizing disruption of the 
Gaza Baptist Hospital via practices of property law. Rightful Palestinian claims to the 
hospital property confounded FMB missionaries who appealed to regional and 
international authorities, like the Egyptian Administration and UNRWA, to avoid property 
seizure. Following 1967, practices of Gazan law were redirected under the Israeli military 
complex. The sudden subsummation of local law, which had legitimized authority in Gaza 
for centuries, opened a legal and political vacuum in which new authorities, like the PLO 
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and Muslim Brotherhood, asserted legitimacy based on the Palestinian body. Legitimacy 
derived from the land shifted to the body, a transformation that directly impacted the 
medical mission. During the mission hospital’s century of existence, it found itself at the 
center of the struggle for authority in Gaza. Approbated for its medicine and repudiated for 
its proselytism, the hospital provoked ambivalent responses that serve as a barometer for 
evolving conceptions of society, medicine, and law in Gaza.  
 While it is impossible to reduce a century of Gazan social, medical, and legal 
history to a single argument, especially when that history is based on the limited records 
of a mission hospital, it is possible to identify trends that led to the formation of the modern 
territory. Most histories of Palestine focus on the transformational wars and political 
moments that defined the region. This thesis, based on the records of a mission hospital, 
took a different approach, complementing political histories of Palestine with a narrative 
that noted subtle developments in Gazan society, medicine, and law. When analyzing the 
mission hospital, the concept of authority becomes pivotal. As Ilana Feldman argues, 
authority is derived from legitimating practices rather than pivotal events.349 For centuries, 
authority in Gaza derived from practices related to the land. Practicing property law gave 
local officials, like the waqf administration, legitimacy when determining the direction of 
Gaza. When the Egyptian Administration curtailed these practices, and the State of Israel 
derailed them, the source of authority in Gaza shifted from the land to the body. The 
mission hospital witnessed the complexity of this evolution. Local authorities once 
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challenged the mission hospital through property law, questioning the legitimacy of foreign 
intervention based on property ownership. The hospital survived these challenges by 
touting the legitimacy of medical practices as they healed Palestinian bodies in Gaza. When 
Israel occupied the land of Gaza, curtailing and redirecting legal processes, the Palestinian 
body became a stake in the struggle for authority, accessible in part through practices of 
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